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A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S.
Hegemony and the Latin Resistance
UGO MATTEI*
INTRODUCTION
This essay attempts to develop a theory of imperial law that is able to
explain post-Cold War changes in the general process of Americanization in
legal thinking. My claim is that "imperial law" is now a dominant layer of
world-wide legal systems.' Imperial law is produced, in the interest of
international capital, by a variety of both public and private institutions, all
sharing a gap in legitimacy, sometimes called the "democratic deficit."
Imperial law is shaped by a spectacular process of exaggeration, aimed at
building consent for the purpose of hegemonic domination. Imperial law
subordinates local legal arrangements world-wide, reproducing on the global
scale the same phenomenon of legal dualism that thus far has characterized the
law of developing countries. Predatory economic globalization is the vehicle,
the all-mighty ally, and the beneficiary of imperial law. Ironically, despite its
absolute lack of democratic legitimacy, imperial law imposes as a natural
necessity, by means of discursive practices branded "democracy and the rule of
law," a reactive legal philosophy that outlaws redistribution of wealth based on
* Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, U.C. Hastings; Professore
Ordinario di Diritto Civile, UniversitA di Torino. J.D. University of Turin (1983); LLM, Boalt Hall
U.C.Berkeley (1989). This article has been produced to be discussed at the Indiana Global Law Symposium
(April 5 2002) and at the Harvard Critical Globalization Conference (April 12 and 13, 2002). 1 have delivered
this article at a variety of workshops and conferences including the Conference on Americanization of legal
thought held in Paris (Archives de Philosophie du Droit, June 2000); the Max Plank Institute (Hamburg,
Germany May 2002); Stanford University (October 2001), the Department of Anthropology of U.C. Berkeley
(September 2001) and the University of Florence (April 2002). I wish to thank Professors Alfred Aman, for
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social solidarity.2 At the core of imperial law there is U.S. law, as transformed
and adapted after the Reagan-Thatcher revolution, in the process of infiltrating
the huge periphery left open after the end of the Cold War. A study of imperial
law requires a careful discussion of the factors of penetration of U.S. legal
consciousness world-wide, as well as a careful distinction between the context
of production and the context of reception 3 of the variety of institutional
arrangements that make imperial law. Factors of resistance need to be fully
appreciated as well.
I. AMERICAN LAW: FROM LEADERSHIP TO DOMINANCE
The years following the Second World War have shown a dramatic change
in the pattern of world hegemony in the law. Leading legal ideas, once
produced in Continental Civilian Europe and exported through the periphery of
the world, are now for the first time produced in a common law jurisdiction:
the United States. There is little question that the present world dominance of
the United States has been economic, military, and political first, and legal only
in a more recent moment, so that a ready explanation of legal hegemony can be
found with a simple Marxist explanation of law as a superstructure of the
economy.5 Nevertheless, the question of the relationship between legal,
political, and economic hegemony is not likely to be correctly addressed within
a cause-and-effect paradigm. 6 Ultimately, addressing this question is a very
2. This essay will not discuss the kind of redistribution (in favor of the winners) that is fostered by
economic globalization and by its violent re-structuring of capitalism. For the best recent discussion available
on this different kind of redistribution, see generally WILLIAM K. TABB, THE AMORAL ELEPHANT:
GLOBALIZATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2001). Every
deep transformation in processes of production through history implies redistribution of wealth across social
classes in favor of the winners. See KARL POLANY, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944). In this essay, however, I will talk of redistribution in the sense of
favoring social solidarity, and therefore aimed at more equality.
3. On this useful theoretical distinction, see Diego Lopez Medina, Comparative Jurisprudence (2000)
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
4. Mirroring this phenomenon, new continental philosophical ideas were incorporated and produced in the
United States by 1969 with Jacques Derrida's seminal lectures at Johns Hopkins University. See generally
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1982) (1972).
5. See generally 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (David Fembach trans.,
Penguin Books 1981) (1867).
6. Comparativists are familiar with the discussion between Watson and Friedman on whether law can
correctly be perceived as a response to social needs. The basic arguments for the opposite positions are set
foreward in ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); W.
FRIEDMANN, LAW IN CHANGING SOCIETY (1959).
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important area of basic jurisprudential research because it reveals some general
aspects about the nature of law as a device of global governance.
Observing historical patterns of legal hegemony allows us to critique the
distinction between two main patterns of governance through the law (and of
legal transplants).7 Scholars of legal transplants have traditionally distinguished
two patterns. The first is law as dominance without hegemony, in which the
legal system is ultimately a coercive apparatus asserting political and economic
power without consent. This area of inquiry and this model have been used to
explain the relationship between the legal system of the motherland and that of
the colonies within imperialistic colonial enterprises. The opposing pattern,
telling a story of consensual voluntary reception by an admiring periphery of
legal models developed and provided for at the center, is usually considered the
most important pattern of legal transplants. It is described by stressing on the
idea of consent within a notion of "prestige." 8
Little effort is necessary to challenge the sufficiency of this basic taxonomy
in introducing legal transplants. Law is a detailed and complex machinery of
social control that cannot function with any degree of effectiveness without
some cooperation from a variety of individuals staffing legal institutions. These
individuals usually consist of a professional elite which either already exists or
is created by the hegemonic power. Such an elite provides the degree of
consent to the reception of foreign legal ideas that is necessary for any legal
transplant to occur. Hence, the distinction between imperialistic and non-
imperialistic transplants is a matter only of degree and not of structure. In order
to understand the nature of present legal hegemony, it is necessary to capture
the way in which the law functions to build a degree of consent to the present
pattern of international economic and political dominance. 9
In this essay I suggest that a fundamental cultural construct of presumed
consent is the rhetoric of democracy and the rule of law utilized by the imperial
model of governance,'0 triumphant worldwide together with the neo-American
7. The literature on legal transplants is now very extensive. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
8. For a critical discussion, see ELISABETrA GRANDE, IMITAZIONE E DiRirlro: IPOTESI SULLA
CIRCOLAZIONE DEI MODELLI (2001). See also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 135, 153 (William Lovitt trans., 1977) (noting a similar pattern in his
continental philosophy).
9. Cf WILLIAM 1. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION, AND
HEGEMONY 21-25 (1996) (providing a similar methodology in political science).
10. See generally MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2001) (developing and discussing the
idea of imperial governance). See also MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM: How AMERICA'S
20031
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model of capitalism developed by the Reagan and Thatcher revolution early in
the 1980s. I argue that the last twenty years have produced the triumph in
global governance of reactive, politically irresponsible institutions, such as the
courts of law, over proactive politically accountable institutions such as direct
administrative apparatuses of the State. 11
This essay attempts to open a radical revision of some accepted modes of
thought about the law as they appear today, at what has been called "the end of
history.' 12 Its aim is to discuss some ways in which global legality has been
created in the present stage of world-wide legal development. It will show how
democracy and the rule of law, in the present legal landscape, are just another
rhetoric of legitimization of a given international dynamic of power. It will also
denounce the present unconscious state in which the law is produced and
developed by professional "consent building" elites. The consequences of such
unconsciousness are creating a legal landscape in which the law is "naturally"
giving up its role of constraining opportunistic behavior of market actors. This
process results in the development of faked rules and institutions that are
functional to the interests of the great capital and that dramatically enlarge
inequality within society. I predict that such a legal environment is unable to
avoid tragic results on a global scale such as those outlined in the well-known
parable of the tragedy of the commons.13
My object of observation is a legal landscape in transition. I wish to
analyze this path of transition from one political setting (the local state) to
another political setting (world governance) in which American-framed reactive
institutions are asserting themselves as legitimate and legitimating governing
bodies, which I call imperial law. Imperial law is the product of a renowned
alliance between state and economic institutions, a cooperative game in which a
very limited number of powerful players are at play.14 While in the ages of
colonialism such political battles for international hegemony were mostly
carried on with an open use of force and political violence (in such a way that
final extensive conflict between superpowers was unavoidable), in the age of
OBSESSION WITH INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SHORT-TERM PROFIT HAS LED IT TO THE BRINK OF
COLLAPSE 16 (Paul Haviland trans., 1993) (using the expression "neo-American" economic model). For a
discussion of Albert's theory as applied to legal transplants, see infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
11. See WILLIAM K. TABB, supra note 2, at 17-22 (discussing the difference between political and
economic globalization).
12. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (introducing
successfully the fortunate, but highly misleading expression "the end of history").
13. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
14. See generally SUSAN GEORGE, REMETTRE LE OMC A SA PLACE (2001).
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globalization and of economic Empire political violence has been transformed
into legal violence.
II. DEVELOPING OUR TOOLS
A. Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony: From Gramsci to the Empire
My study of legal imperialism builds on Antonio Gramsci's notion of
hegemony. '5 Gramsci defines hegemony as power reached by a combination of
force and consent. Power cannot be reached only by brute force; it needs to be
imposed by individuals that voluntarily accept government. Building on this
suggestion, Louis Althusser has suggested that force is the province of the
repressive apparatuses of the state like the army and the police, while consent
is gained by means of what he called the ideological apparatuses of the state
like schools, churches, or media. 16  Such ideological apparatuses make
hegemony more acceptable and at the same time make ideology a cross-class
concept, thus going beyond the narrow Marxist idea of ideology as a class-
specific device.' 7 Hegemony is therefore reached at least in part by a diffusion
of power (needed in order to gain consensus) between a plurality of individuals.
Such diffusion of power becomes a key concept in Michel Foucault's refutation
of the idea of hegemony as a top-down imposition of power. Through his
work, Foucault conceived of power as a relational position inherent in the very
posture of every individual in society which, in turn, is determined by the so-
called discursive practices.
18
Diffusion of power carries as a consequence the birth of counter-hegemony,
itself a powerful tool to defeat top-down attempts of hegemony. French critical
thinker Gui Debord focuses on the impact of media and new communicative
15. Hegemony has been a key concept in Gramsci's reflections. It has been developed, outside of any
systematic effort, throughout his work. See generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCi (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971); see also
generally AN ANTONIO GRAMSCI READER: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1916-1935 (D. Forgacs ed., 1988)
(providing a good selection of Gramsci's work).
16. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Lo STATO ED I SUOI APPARATI (1997).
17. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Ben Brewster trans., 1971); see
also Louis ALTHUSSER & E. BALIBAR, READING CAPITAL (1997) (discussing the full-fledged overtaking of
ideology as a class-specific device).
18. MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan M. Sheridan Smith trans., Routledge
1989) (1972). The basic notions approached in the text, however, have been developed throughout Foucault's
massive scholarly production. See generally, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984).
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technology on human behavior and develops the notion of the individual as
spectator and consumer within what he defines as the "spectacle society."
Maintaining the Marxist tradition of focusing on the actual means of production
that determine the organization of society, Debord demonstrates that "the
spectacle" is not a marginal aspect of the post-modem society. Rather, it
determines its very economic structure, capable of transforming the exploited
proletariat into a much courted "consumer. "'9 The proletariat is not considered
only as labor force. In a notion that is developed also by French sociologist
Baudrillard, the consumer is a worker who does not know to work.2 °
Understanding the "spectacle" allows a better understanding of present-day
American hegemony.
The ways in which patterns of law have been historically exported can be
captured within a variety of models. A first model is direct
imperialistic/colonial rule, or imposition of legal patterns by military force, as it
happened during times of military conquest (i.e. the Napoleonic Code imposed
in Belgium; McArthur's reforms in post-World War II Japan, and so forth).
This notion of imposition by force needs to be qualified, by taking into the
account the structural need for institutional staffing and for cooperation of
institutional actors to make a system work.2'
A second model can be described as imposition by bargaining, in the sense
that acceptance of a legal model is part of a subtle blackmail.2 2  Targeted
countries are persuaded to change the law according to Western standards in
order to get access to the international market and to remain economically
viable. History offers examples of this model in China, Japan, and Egypt early
in the last century, and today, this is the most important way in which the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and
European Union operate through the developing and former socialist world.
19. This transformation of the proletarian into a consumer not only updates but also radically transforms
the way in which Marxist theory works. Revolutionary ideologist Luckacs's notions of commodification,
reification and, in particular, contemplation are used by Debord to see how the once exploited proletarian and
now consumer is persuaded by the structure of the show of the existence of a "second nature." See GUY
DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE 25 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., Zone Books 1995) (1977)
(citing GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS (Rodney
Livingstone trans., Merlin Press 1971) (1968)).
20. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 14-18 (Chris Turner trans.,
Sage Publications 1998) (1970).
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
22. See Sally Falk Moore, An International Legal Regime and the Context of Conditionality, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 1, at 333 (describing the model also as "context of
conditionality").
U.S. HEGEMONY AND THE LATIN RESISTANCE
A third model, constructed as fully consensual, has been presented as
diffusion by prestige, focusing on a deliberate process of institutional
admiration that leads to the reception of law.23 My claim is that the process of
Americanization in the last few years can only be understood within a clear
perception that ideological apparatuses are at play, producing spectacular
propaganda that allows the produced legal consciousness to circulate.
These preliminary remarks show some shortcomings of the comparative
discussions of legal transplants that proceed outside of the analytical framework
of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Indeed, the hegemony/counter-hegemony
framework is crucial to understanding that force can never by itself be
sufficient; it always needs a more or less extensive degree of institutional
consent to operate. What is even more important is that the framework allows
us to perceive the naively anthropomorphic nature of most traditional analyses.
Legal transplants cannot be seen as happening as the result of the choice of one
mind that freely or coactively receives the produced model. Both in the phase
of production and in the phase of reception, legal transplants are a lively
dialectic between consent and dissent, between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces, between mainstream and critical approaches. In other
words, dominant and dominated positions have to be considered in the picture
because they allow an understanding of the high complexity of the picture.
B. Reactive Institutions as the Fundamental Structure of U.S. Law
In previous papers, I have outlined the fundamental structure behind what I
called "the rule of professional law" and the historical reasons for current
American intellectual leadership in the world's legal landscape.24 The
fundamental structure of American law has unfolded to become a politically
legitimized system in which straight political power is counterbalanced by a
double set of professional (counter-majoritarian) checks. Such a system is the
result of imports from Europe digested and made spectacular by way of
"exaggeration" in the United States.
23. See WATSON, supra note 7; see also Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to
Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 397-400 (1991) (introducing the notion of prestige); GRANDE,
supra note 8 (discussing the notion of prestige).
24. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns ofLaw: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 5 (1997) (explaining the rule of professional law) [hereinafter Three Patterns of Law]; Ugo
Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994)
(explaining U.S. leadership).
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By the early part of the last century (a century significantly labeled "the
American century"), 25 U.S. law had already received from Europe, and digested
in a genuinely original way, the fundamental components of its legal structure.
The English common law tradition has transmitted to the former colony the
ideal of judges as oracles of the law and of a strong, independent judiciary as
the institutional framework in which judges can perform their role of guardians
of individual rights. American law has developed this legacy and
"exaggerated" it to the point of inventing constitutional adjudication. Judges
are not only the oracles of the law and the leaders of the professional legal
system; they also have the power to declare, in the process of adjudication,
political decisionmaking as unconstitutional.26 Because of such outstanding
extension ofj udicial power within American law, the belief, already noticed by
Tocqueville that any political problem can sooner or later be decided by a
court of law has been carried to its symbolic extreme in the Nuremberg Trials,
28and possibly to its very limit in Bush v. Gore.
The civil law tradition has also transmitted some fundamental modes of
thought that U.S. law has been busy expanding and exaggerating through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. France has conveyed to the United States
the idea of universal individual rights. These "negative" rights of first
generation have been enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, influential as they
were on the majority of the founding fathers. 29 Not only has this universalistic
25. See, e.g., OLIVIER ZUNZ, PERCHE IL SECOLO AMERICANO? [WHY THE AMERICAN CENTURY?] (2002);
see also, e.g., ERIC HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1914-1991 15
(1994). See generally GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE
ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1994).
26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
27. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, (Richard D. Heffner ed., Signet Classic 2001)
(1956). Very recently, an important book has discussed "adversarial legalism," something similar to my idea
of "reactive institutional setting," as the "American way of law." See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). Kagan's work builds and expands, beyond the limits of
procedure, important and influential ideas set forward in comparative law by Damaka some time ago. See
MIRiAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS 73-80 (1986). My arguments carry the point forward. The "reactive way" cannot be seen as
a mere feature of American law, but is actually the fundamental philosophy of globalization that, as a new
layer of legal systems forms worldwide, pushes for a complex variety of processes of privatization of the legal
system.
28. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall ofthe Political Question Doctrine and the
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002). See generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v.
Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CALL. REV. 1721 (2001) (providing a discussion of the
decision in light of legal history); 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-95 (2002) (providing a general discussion
by several authors).
29. See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION (2002)
(providing a recent, fascinating discussion of the credo and ideology of the Founding Fathers).
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ideal been carried to the extreme, as witnessed among other things by notions
of universal jurisdiction of U.S. courts in the vindication of such rights, 30 but
negative rights, in the absence of thick notions of sovereignty and statehood
developed by the Jacobeans, became a genuine limit to the redistributive
activity of the American state. Notions of freedom from government intrusion
were by no means limited to judicial lawmaking in the Lochner era. A strong
limit to any proactive activity of government, except in areas such as defense,
can be seen as the result of French-inspired notions of (economic) rights.
Also, Germany has transmitted to the United States one of its fundamental
present-day characteristics: the presence of strong, independent academic
institutions as another source of professional check on the political process. It
was only because the law was considered a science that it was natural to argue
for its teaching in university contexts. Otherwise it could well have remained a
practical business, as it continued to be in England until well after the Victorian
age. American law schools (professional schools staffed with faculty that
regard themselves as academic scholars) are the only ones in the world that
offer basic legal education at the graduate school level. Consequently, and
paradoxically for a system based on "professional schooling," the average
American lawyer is exposed to more years of academic training that any other
colleague in the world. Moreover, because of this further exaggeration as
compared to academic undergraduate legal education in Europe, American
academia can well be seen today as the global lawyer's graduate school in the
sense that ambitious lawyers worldwide complete their undergraduate legal
education in the United States.3 '
There is another fundamental structure of U.S. law that, in my opinion,
makes it better suited to the framework of the global market: its high degree of
decentralization. This is possibly the most original aspect of the fundamental
structure of U.S. law. No other legal system in the world has developed a full-
fledged federal judicial system as complete and sophisticated as the United
States has. The co-existence of a large number of federal and state courts made
issues of jurisdiction and choice of law the primary concern of the American
legal profession. These are the same issues that are on the table of the lawyer
approaching global problems. American lawyers already enjoy a legal culture
and discourse that is broader than jurisdictional limits. In this scenario, the
30. See discussion infra Part VII.
31. See Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception ofAmerican Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229,233-35
(1991).
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annexing of one more jurisdiction, wherever located, does not particularly
change the U.S. lawyer's way of reasoning.
The very structure of the American judicial process, moreover,
decentralizes power and activity. A large variety of activities within litigation
which are labeled "official" in European legal systems, such as service of
process, discovery, and questioning of witnesses, are already private matters in
American law.32 This powerful combination of adaptive forces makes the
structure of American law sufficiently familiar so as not to be excessively
feared,33 yet sufficiently ambiguous to be successful in the international legal
landscape.
Another crucial aspect of American hegemony is the equation between
democracy and elections. The majority rule principle, quite uncritically
embraced in the United States, appears natural and obvious as long as we
compare it to its absurd opposite, that of the minority rule. But if we think to
how numerous and various can be the means to give to a group a unitary will
we should ask whether Sumner Maine was not right when claiming that the
majority rule is the most artificial between all those available.35 The majority
rule as expressed by elections has institutionalized in the United States the
notion of a market for votes that carries as a structural consequence a high
degree of spectacular selection of leadership, mostly determined by media
control and availability of extensive economic means.
It is important to the present analysis to observe the way in which these
basic European institutional factors have been carried to the extreme and thus
"exaggerated" in the United States. Judges develop as full-fledged supervisors
of the direct political process. Individual rights develop an unprecedented
universal jurisdictional reach. Lawyers develop highly technocratic skills of
social engineering. Elections, along with media power, defeat political parties
as laboratories of political consent and as agencies leading to the reduction of
class differences.
32. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 428, 448 (6th ed. 1998).
33. On discovery and "fishing expeditions" as spectacular practices resented in Europe, see the discussion
infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
34. See GLOBALIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURE, POWER, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL
PUBLIC SPHERE (John A. Guidry et al. eds., 2000); see also Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations (January
2003) (paper delivered at the Harvard Globalization Symposium, forthcoming on Suffolk University Law
Review) (discussing political ambiguity as an explanation for worldwide success of a legal pattern).
35. See LUCIANO CANFORA, CRITICA DELLA RETORICA DEMOCRATICA (2002); see also EDOARDO
RUFFINI, LA RAGIONE DEI P10: RICERCHE SULLA STORIA DEL PRINCIPIO MAGGIORITARIO (1977); H. SUMNER
MAINE, ETUDES SUR L'HISTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS PRIMITIVES (Ernest Thorin ed., 1880).
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As shown in the previous section, U.S. law has been able to become the
"extreme West" of the Western legal tradition36 whose fundamental notions are
plainly and structurally incompatible with alternative ideas such as, for
example, "Socialist legality" or "Islamic jurisprudence." Countries which
embrace or have embraced these radically alternative views have always been
located at the "periphery" of the free world. Interestingly, even those countries
such as European democracies, traditionally located at the center, have been
gradually pushed to the periphery in the building process of global governance
by a constant erosion of the activist philosophies of their sovereign states. The
less than full development of decentralized reactive institutions has been
singled out as a problematic factor, even in the European context. The new
periphery, just as much as the traditional one, maintains certain legal factors
that are an irritant for an American-inspired global legal consciousness.
From the very aftermath of World War II, it became quite apparent that the
notion of sovereignty and statehood developed in the civil law was exposed to a
strong structural critique. The notion, enshrined in the Hegelian philosophical
tradition, that the State was an organ pursuing its own sovereign interest,
ontologically different and occasionally incompatible with the aggregate of the
individual rights of its subjects, was in many quarters made accountable for the
trashing of the rule of law in fascist Europe. An alternative vision of
sovereignty was found in the notion that the State was nothing more than "the
government in office" (typical of the pragmatic Anglo-American tradition),
pursuing an interest that had to coincide with the aggregate of individuals'
interests, and whose activity was to be limited to this function by technocratic
checks.
The roots were established for the "naturalization" of the American way,
and for its fundamental challenge to the hierarchical relationship between the
political process and free (market) activity. Such process of naturalization of
the institutional setting of the free world was started in America in 1952 by
President Eisenhower's conservative political platform that defeated President
Truman's Fair Deal. Reinforced through the Cold War as a polemic towards
socialism, the suspicion of activist redistributive policies and of government
intervention in matters other than defense constantly controlled American
politics and, through its influence, the present posture of the international
financial institutions.
36. See JEAN PHILIPPE MATHY, EXTRPME OCCIDENT: FRENCH INTELLECTUALS AND AMERICA (1993).
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Local American scholarly evolutions made the prestige of U.S. law felt by
legal professionals worldwide, so that the intellectual leadership of American
law is now an undisputable fact. The years of the Cold War and the demise of
western legality that has characterized most of the communist regimes in the
U.S.S.R. orbit of influence have confirmed the perceived benefits of the three
fundamental symbols of the American rule of law: spectacular elections (a sort
of advertising spot for democracy), independent judiciary (with highly
spectacular interventions in U.S. political life), and free and creative academic
critique of the political and of the judicial process. None of these tenets was
characteristic of the Soviet bloc, so the imposition of such fundamental
characteristics became the recipe for change in the aftermath of the fall of the
Soviet Republic.
III. HEGEMONY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FOE: THE REPRESSIVE
INSTITUTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The last ten years of the last century have been crucial to the refinement of
imperialistic and hegemonic aspects of American law. Nobody has put it more
clearly, though moderately, than leading international lawyer Richard Falk:
The logic of hegemonic authority extends beyond the
implications of unequal power and influence to encompass the
rather amorphous, yet significant, role of "global leadership."
Such a hegemonic role in an era of moderated international
conflict is premised on military power. But also crucially
important is a normative reputation as a generally benevolent
political actor and a provider of order beneficial for the global
public good, not just for the national interests of the
hegemon.37
The very same rhetoric of freedom has guided U.S. international interventions
from World War II to the present ideological construction of the Islamic world
(represented by Komeini, Saddam, and the Taliban) as the living denial of the
kind of universal freedom, based on gender equality and universal human
37. Richard Falk, Re-framing the Legal Agenda of World Order in the Course of a Turbulent Century, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 1, at 355, 369.
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rights, that is inextricably connected with the neo-liberal capitalist model of
development.38
The nineties were the decade in which U.S. power (and consequently, law)
turned from leadership to hegemony. Most western communist and socialist
parties have started a major self-critique, and leftist intellectuals' discovery of
the virtues of the market has provided some quite extreme attitudes.39 The end
of the Cold War has been depicted by many commentators as an endogenous
phenomenon within the socialist world. The highly proactive political
apparatus of the soviet "concentrated spectacle," to use Debord's notion,40
simply could not resist processes of internal corruption accelerated by the sense
of freedom and by dynamics of opportunism that were precluded from any
socially beneficial spillover effect. This is, however, a very simplistic vision of
the fall of the Soviet Empire. A variety of other factors must be considered too:
exogenous factors such as technological competition (e.g. the Star Wars system
of the Reagan administration) that created an unbearable economic pressure for
the Socialist State,4' and the undisputable spectacular appeal of the consumer's
society, made accessible to would-be consumers by enhanced media reach.
What is important to point out is that technological evolutions were the
protagonists of most of these and other relevant events. And military as well as
media technology became the creed of the next step in the development of
global ideology: the sense that technology can defeat demography. This notion
38. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
(1996) (discussing the construction of a new confrontation, substituting Islamism for the Cold War); cf.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, AND OTHER WRITINGS (1988) (providing a similar
idea from a post-structuralist perspective).
39. The shift of leftist paradigms to notions compatible with the official dogma of neo-liberalism is usually
associated with Toni Blair's New Labour. For the intellectual rationalization of this evolution, see A.
GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998). The consequences of refusal to
adapt to the new post-Cold War economic policy are best appreciated by considering the forced resignation of
Chancellor Oskar Lafontaine in 1998, substituted by the "new leftist" paradigm of Chancellor Schroeder for
the same party. See Falk, supra note 37, at page 370 n.51.
40. GUI DEBORD, COMMENTARI ALLA SOCIETA DELLO SPETrACOLO [COMMENTS ON THE SOCIETY OF THE
SPECTACLE] (Malcolm Imrie trans., Verso Books 1998) (1997).
41. Factors of resistance against the Soviet empire, such as religion in many of its Islamic provinces and
the Afghanistan war, readily turned into a Soviet Vietnam, also account for the final collapse. See BRUNO
BONGIOVANNI, STORIA DELLA GUERRA FREDDA (2001) (emphasizing notions of terror balance and
containment as key realist notions in Cold War international relations). See generally FROM COLD WAR TO
COLLAPSE: THEORY AND WORLD POLITICS IN THE 1980s (Mike Bowker & Robin Brown eds., 1993).
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has determined, among other things, the politics and ideology of immigration
law through the West.42
With "enemy number one" defeated, it became almost immediately
apparent that socialism was not the only radically incompatible alternative to
the Western institutional setting. American foreign policy did not need to
change much, since its technological presence43 was still required by its
European allies, whose internal political landscape constantly and incrementally
turned to the right. 4 By the early nineties, the socialists had been defeated in
France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. In Scandinavian countries, the social-
democratic experiment was facing a tremendous and perhaps irreversible crisis.
In Russia, the communists were forced to accept a spectacular electoral
confrontation in which they would have no chance to win, given the technical
skills of and the foreign aid to the opposite front.45 Notions of "third way" or
"New Labour" witnessed a dramatic convergence of the European political
landscape with the American counterpart. In the United States, at least since
the "Great Society," the differential in class representation between the
Democrats and the Republicans was blurred. President Clinton and Prime
Minister Blair have been the icons of the political establishment and the long
wave of the conservative revolution well beyond the political platform of the
Republicans and the Tories.
A culture of exclusion and of assertion characterized Western domestic and
foreign policy in the United States and, following its lead, in Europe. Zero
tolerance for illegal immigration is now the common slogan of conservative
governments and of their institutional oppositions throughout the West.46
Meanwhile, in the international arena, NATO could incrementally and
dramatically change its nature. At the recent NATO summit with President
42. See generally The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000)
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER].
43. This mental framework is reflected by "realist" paradigms in international law. See Falk, supra note
37, at 357.
44. See John Gray, The Passing of Social Democracy, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER, supra
note 42, at 328.
45. Communist candidate Ziuganov's chances of victory were addressed by international advisors through
the creation of a nationalist leader, General Lebed.
46. See Linda Bosniak, Critical Reflections on "Citizenship" as a Progressive Aspiration, in LABOUR LAW
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATWE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 339, 342 (Joanne
Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (noting that illegal immigrants are treated as "second class citizens"); see also C.
Joppke, Sovereignty and Citizenship in a World of Migration, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra
note 1, at 259.
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Putin, the basis was set for a new strategic and offensive alliance for the further
expansion of the free global market. NATO leaders and their former foes now
share a new common enemy and a new common agenda. Within the notion of
fundamentalist Islamic-originated terrorist activity, there is space for such
different phenomena as the Chechenia resistance, the Middle Eastern war, and
of course, the War on Terror so far carried out against Afghanistan, and
threatened against Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia.
NATO strikes in Bosnia, the Gulf War (Desert Storm), and Somalia (the
Restore Hope mission) and, more recently, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
have been the most visible recent instances in which the repressive institutions
of the global society have had a chance to prove their strengths. Thousands of
innocent people were killed while public opinion and media propaganda
focused on the redress of international human rights that the strikes were
guaranteeing.47 Some international law scholars now define the Bosnia NATO
strikes as illegal.48 The Somali experience shows that areas that were not
reached by the International effort of the U.N. Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM) are today well ahead of the others in the pacification process. 49
The George W. Bush administration has introduced itself to the world by a
similar campaign to enforce international law. The more recent "War on
Terror" has confirmed the early attitude of the incumbent U.S. administration.
Interestingly, all these actions have been carried on in contexts characterized by
a hegemony of political law and/or traditional law within the deep
characteristics of the legal system.50 All such interventions have been targeted
towards societies in which professional law had always remained either absent
or very superficial and in which democracy and the rule of law, as products of
Western civilization/colonization, could be seen as deeply foreign to local
conditions.
47. See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING
WORLD ORDER 182-243 (1996).
48. Given that illegality is the rule rather than the exception, the tight language of the U.N. Charter
outlawing aggressive war has always been considered utopian and unrealistic. See, e.g., WALTER MILLIS &
JAMES REAL, THE ABOLITION OF WAR (1963); GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE
THROUGH WORLD LAW (3d ed. 1966); RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975).
49. This is the case in Somaliland and Puntland State (both recently singled out by the Bush administration,
however, as potential targets for anti-terrorism strikes). See Ugo Mattei, Patterns of African Constitution in
the Making, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 1, at 275, 282 (regarding the situation in
Puntland).
50. For a taxonomy of legal systems based on a distinction between the rule of professional law, rule of
political law, and rule of traditional law, see Three Patterns of Law, supra note 24.
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Islamic law has been able to claim a thorough degree of legitimacy by
means of circuits of legitimization that are typical of non-western societies." In
former Yugoslavia, the traditional gate between Islam and Christianity,
effective centralized secular institutions were established in Tito's time.
52
Nevertheless, during the communist era, legitimacy was never based on
elections, and the Western notion of rule of law was substituted by a kind of
socialist legality. The circuits of power legitimacy in former Yugoslavia were
to be found more in notions of military leadership than otherwise. The rise of
Milosevic to power and the Pan-Serbian dream cannot be explained much
differently than as an episode of skillful charismatic leadership.
Somalia and Afghanistan have much in common, in addition to their
strategic geographic position around the oil area. They are both traditionally
decentralized societies and have both experienced processes of more thorough
social penetration of Islam in recent times. They are both internally divided in
ethnic polarization, but at the same time, both have strong national identities.
Both countries are very far from any idea of legitimacy based on majority rule.
They both lack a Westernized legal elite strong enough to be an effective
professional competitor to traditional and political legitimization. The principle
of group unanimity in legitimate rulemaking and of war as a legitimating factor
of leadership are strong and fierce factors of resistance towards western notions
of democracy, rule of law and individual human rights.53
Not much needs to be said of Iraq to show the fundamental incompatibility
of its social structure with Western notions of legality and Western institutions.
Iraq falls straight within notions of leadership and legitimacy that are very
common in the area and that are deeply rooted (although at times much
challenged) in Islam. Once again, arguing for Western democracy and the rule
of law in a centralized Islamic society is only a display of Western-centric neo-
colonial arrogance.
The structure of power and the deep bases of legitimacy of the legal
systems in these countries targeted by operations of war are shared by a
majority of the countries on Earth. It is no excess of cultural relativism to
51. Islamic law has been a successful provider of "public goods" such as security, charity, and education in
many places where the Western notion of State simply failed. See Ugo Mattei, Foreign Inspired Courts as
Agencies of Peace in Troubled Societies: A Plea for Realism andfor Creativity, 2 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2002),
at http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol2/iss 1/art 1.
52. See generally GIANNANTONIO A. BENACCHIO, LA CIRCOLAZIONE DEI MODELLI GIURIDICI TRA GLI
SLAVI DEL SUD: SLOVENI, CROATI, SERBI (1995).
53. See generally Mattei, supra note 51.
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observe this simple fact. Nor is it foreign to Western notions of equality of
treatment under the law to reflect on the one-sided way in which international
law is enforced.5 4 In the global world, the repressive institutions are the same
as they have always been-the power of weapons is the rule. 5 This is not, of
course, the place to discuss and catalogue the many occasions on which
repressive international institutions have policed and enforced the new world
order, born after World War II and accomplished after the symbolic fall of the
Berlin Wall.56 For the purposes of this discussion, we can assume that force, in
the form of international military enterprises under U.S. leadership, is still the
most important instrument for imposing the hegemony of Western values.5 7
Further, we can assume that much of the hegemonic position of the United
States has been achieved by developing and accomplishing unchallenged
primacy of physical strengths. 8
Much more interesting, for our purpose, is to reflect on the ways in which
political consent is reached around such use of force. Loyalty seems mandatory
in the new global order. 59 The discursive practices of the dominant realist
international law culture are to be considered at least in part responsible for this
60phenomenon. °
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
There is no doubt that international law has offered a rhetoric capable of
justifying the use of force by the repressive apparatuses of global governance,
and that therefore it has played the role of an ideological institution responsible
54. NoAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILITARY HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM Kosovo 1-80 (1999) (critiquing
this attitude); see also Falk, supra note 37. On the dangers of such a double standard for the role of
international leadership, see TORBJORN L. KNUTSEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF WORLD ORDERS (1999).
55. See generally ROBERT HARVEY, THE RETURN OF THE STRONG: THE DRIFT TO GLOBAL DISORDER
(1995); see also generally JAMES MAYALL, THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994: UNITED NATIONS
EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND SOMALIA (1996).
56. See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1997).
57. See Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36 (1999) (espousing an extreme
position on the right).
58. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER
(1990).
59. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996).
60. See Falk, supra note 37, at 357 (discussing "the self serving acceptance by policymakers of some
variant of realism as the proper mode of thought pertaining to international relations").
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for the idea that violence towards innocent people can be "legal," and that a war
of destruction can be "fair.
' 61
The rhetorical device used in the process of repressing deviance has been a
genuinely legal concept, that of "international human rights." 62 Indeed, a
doctrine of limited sovereignty in the interest of international human rights has
threatened the traditional nature of international law as a decentralized system
63
based on territoriality, and has advocated the need for centralization in order to
make international law more similar to systems of national law. The
International Criminal Court is the most advanced point of this shift. Ad hoc
courts, such as the one presently used against former Yugoslavian president
Slobodan Milosevic, are the product of an even more open use of international
law as an ex post facto legitimating factor of war. 64
Today we believe that international law is not natural but positive law,
whose fundamental sources are treaties and customs. Tomorrow, we might
believe that international law is a worldwide legal system grounded in
uniformity and in commonly shared ideals of law and order.65 International
codes, international courts and international jails are already claiming to be
generally recognized and established. Many commentators already approach
international politics as if such an international centralized legal system were in
place. With such a system in place (assuming that it is in place), the
transformation of war into police power follows as a matter of course. Hence
sovereignty can be routinely addressed as deviance from a standard of legality
grounded in U.S.-constructed international human rights.6
It is interesting to observe that this process in international law is just the
opposite of the general trend in jurisprudence. Scholars are today observing the
triumph of pluralism and decentralization as a consequence of the failures of
61. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 318 (1998); see also HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
(Jonathan Moore ed., 1998).
62. See Richard Falk, The Quest for Human Rights in an Era of Globalization, in FUTURE
MULTILATERALISM: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 153, 157 (Michael G. Schechter ed., 1999).
63. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977).
64. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996).
65. See generally RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1998).
66. See generally BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
(Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995); see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (United States-centric critique of sovereignty); NOAM CHOMSKY, ROGUE
STATES : THE RULE OF FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS II, 124-55 (2000) (discussing the dangers of looking at
the United States as a normative leader in international law).
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the legal monism advocated by state-centric positivism. A process of de-
positivization in jurisprudence is very clear.67 This can be seen as a cultural
delay of international law, difficult to overcome but indeed in the process of
being addressed by the best scholarship in the field.68
But the tool used to gain consensus, the doctrine of international human
rights, is indeed very powerful,69 and has initiated the process of transformation
of the very conception of international law developed after the birth of the
modem nation-state. Such flourishing is however problematic because it
provides a selective justification for intervention in the internal political
business of all states that are not culturally aligned with Western law.7 °
Neo-colonial practices in the Third World are to a great extent originated
by the evolution of advanced capitalism in the United States (what I have
referred to as the neo-American model) and by its diffusion at the periphery
within a reactive philosophy of governance that, outside of effective "reactive"
institutions such as the one developed in the United States, paves the way to
exploitive opportunistic behavior.7 ' Of course, it would be thoroughly
inaccurate to see colonialism as a vehicle of Americanization. Only post-
colonialism can be fairly seen as such. The unfolding of U.S. rule has indeed
been a phenomenon that is better captured by the notion of imperialism than by
that of outright colonialism.
73
To begin with, imperialism is not limited as a relationship between
"developed" and "developing," or between a colonizing nation-state and
colonized people kept under foreign rule. An imperialistic desire attempts the
67. The pluralistic framework has been recently proposed to address issues of legal globalization. See
Snyder, supra note 1.
68. See generally Falk, supra note 37.
69. Even in the U.S. the movement has been more or less benevolently criticized from a variety of
perspectives. See, e.g., Ellen Messer, Anthropology and Human Rights, 22 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 221
(1993) (surveying the (Anglophone) anthropological literature); see also Celina Romany, State Responsibility
Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994).
70. See, e.g., L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the
Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1997). See generally,
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE
PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995).
71. See generally RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (1999).
72. See MARC FERRO, COLONIZATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY (1997)
73. See generally P. Hirst, and G. Thompson, Globalization and the History of the International Economy,
in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER, supra note 42, at 274-86; see also generally WILLIAM
ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY-GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996).
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global imposition of its values and fundamental structures of government and
modes of thought worldwide. In this sense, it is clear that communism has been
an imperialistic attempt aiming at final worldwide success. Imperialism
requires an "imperial ideal," a stronger ideological apparatus that can be
reached only by means of strong and well-developed "ideological
institutions., 74 The ideals of a global market, of international human rights, of
freedom throughout the world, and most notably of the "rule of law" perform
this ideological role.75 Imperialism does not necessarily need to be a conscious
effort,76 nor must it spell out an imperialistic doctrine, prescribing steps towards
a final condition of imperial hegemony.77
The recent transformation of international law from a decentralized system
of foreign sovereigns to a progressively more centralized legal system governed
by professional elites staffing (international) courts of law is a more or less
conscious reproduction of the reactive philosophy of the U.S. government by
courts. As such, it is reproducing on the world scale a professional legal
ideology of neutrality, democracy, and rule of law, granting legitimacy to the
worldwide exercise of the United States's unprecedented political strength.
Just as U.S. domestic doctrines of separation of powers, political questions, and
sovereign immunity allow the U.S. government a quite extended and unnoticed
degree of unrestricted power,78 similarly an international law governed by
courts of law (on the Nuremberg model), rather than by negotiation between
decentralized sovereign States, should produce the fa9ade of legitimacy for the
exercise of worldwide hegemony. Of course, the fear of counter-hegemonic use
of such an international centralized legal system explains the reluctance of the
U.S. government to support the International Criminal Court.79 The moment is
ripe for introducing, within the legal field of international law, the notion of
counter-hegemony as used in this article.
74. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 10, at 17-20; Robert W. Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International
Relations: An Essay in Method, 12 J. INT'L STUD. 162, 172 (1983).
75. On ideology, as with false consciousness, the classic is still KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS,
L'IDEOLOGIA TEDESCA (1958).
76. It might also be rhetoric such as that used in the title of Nye's book, "Bound to Lead." See NYE, supra
note 58. The question naturally rises: Who is binding whom?
77. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule ofLaw. Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79 (1999).
78. See, for a discussion on the theory and practice of Sovereign Immunity, K. Nelson, Sovreign Immunity
as a doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1561 (2002).
79. See Harris Institute for Global Legal Studies, Should the United States Ratify the Treaty Establishing
the International Criminal Court? (International Debate Series, 2002) (providing competing views for and
against supporting the International Criminal Court).
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V. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY
In addition to politics (and economics), technology is also a major source of
institutional change.80 The nineties were also opened by the invention of the
internet www protocol. It is worth noting, at least incidentally, that the internet
originated from the need for speedy and secure communication of data to be
used for military purposes during the Cold War years. It is therefore easy for
conservative ideology to appraise it as a beneficial spillover of military
research, and as convincing evidence of the need for allocation of yet more
resources to the repressive apparatuses of the global governance, such as "star
81
wars" projects.
It is enough to browse the internet once to see its American cultural
imprinting. The quantitative and qualitative advantage of U.S.-based English
language sites is just another piece of evidence of the very strong cultural
hegemony of the United States. 82 The so-called "digital divide" is the virtual
epiphany of the appalling growth of the difference between rich and poor
countries, created and structured by another ideological apparatus of global
governance: intellectual property.83 Information is today the most important
source of wealth. Intellectual property, rooted in an extreme Western
naturalistic notion of property law, is incompatible with fundamental
communitarian values of non-Western societies. Western intellectual property
is expanded worldwide through the internet and through the Trade Related
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). It formalizes the disparity of
wealth and power that technology has been able to produce. 84  The non-
territorial nature of intellectual property, as symbolized by the internet and the
claim of universality and of objectivity of its justification, is producing more
institutional change.
80. See generally DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT (1969); see also generally
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & DAVID J. GERBER, PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
(1997).
8 1. There is abundant talk about the "American comparative advantage in technology" as a legitimating
strategy. For a brilliant critical discussion with reference to many such hegemonic strategies, see Ruth Gana
Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 119
(1999).
82. See ARiUNAPPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
83. See Ngaire Woods, Order, Globalization and Inequality in World Politics, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 42, at 387, 389.
84. This is a phenomenon that is byno means a novelty. See generally DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE TOOLS
OF EMPIRE: TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1981).
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Global legitimacy of intellectual property is rooted in the notion that
individual creativity deserves a prize and that exclusive property rights
constitute such a prize. We are back to Locke and to natural law justifications
of individualistic ownership. Nobody would farm without the guarantee of
exclusive property of the outcome of his/her labor. Similarly, nobody would
have incentives to create without intellectual property granting a monopoly on
his/her creativity. Nobody would genetically modify seeds with no guarantee
that the legal system would help to impose such technology on farmers
worldwide, forcing them to abandon communitarian practices of seed sharing
and swapping. 85 Of course, such eighteenth-century rhetoric, reinforced today
by simplistic neoclassical legal and economic models such as those used in
mainstream law and economics literature,8 6 denies notions of alienation and
exploitation, and the simple fact that intellectual property rights freeze the
status quo rather than promoting innovation and change.
87
The general universalistic individual-centered philosophy propagated by
intellectual property and by the institutions created to enforce it worldwide
(World Intellectual Property Organization, TRIPs, and so forth)88 serves the
purpose of redefining territorial ideas of sovereignty to be more functional to
the needs of the Empire and of the big corporate actors. 89 The hegemonic
aspects of the intellectual property revolution are easy to perceive, both in their
component of power (economic and political pressures to force non-Western
countries to accept international intellectual property protection agreements)
and in their ideological component, indispensable to reaching agreement
(intellectual property justified as a universal natural law conception). Of
85. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New
World Order ofInternational Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998).
86. For a critique, see UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAw AND ECONOMICS (1997). The hegemonic
consequence of this intellectual cast is stressed by Okediji, supra note 81, at 147-51 (particularly in recent
years, the pervasive ideology of liberalized or free trade cast intellectual property protection as a primary
factor in penetrating foreign markets and (re)establishing U.S. dominance in the global economy).
87. See Woods, supra note 83, at 389. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture oflnnovation, 51
DUKE L.J. 1783 (2002).
88. See generally MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENTS (1996).
89. For example, the territorial notions of statehood and sovereignty in Kuwait, such as those proclaimed
and defended for the last time during the Persian Gulf War (and those that have been forgotten by NATO
during the Bosnia strikes), are certainly weakened by the universalistic, non-territorial philosophy that justifies
intellectual property as a prize for technological creativity. Why should territorial Gulf and African States own
the oil that happens to be within their territorial borders? Why should oil worldwide not be allocated as a prize
for the skills in extracting and using it as a source of energy? State territorial sovereignty should yield to the
global needs of humankind as interpreted by the global economy.
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course, as in all institutions of hegemony, intellectual property is also one-
sided, not only in its content but also in its actual use. Suffice it to compare the
generic anti-AIDS drugs saga in South Africa (where as many people die of
AIDS every week as the victims of the September 11 th events) with the
treatment and the respect that the intellectual property of the German-based
Bayer pharmaceutical company has been granted by the Bush administration in
the aftermath of the Anthrax crisis in the fall of 2001.90
In shifting from hegemony to counter-hegemony, one finds more interesting
lessons. It is indeed by the use of the internet that the counter-hegemonic
potential of the challenge to intellectual property becomes apparent. Gui
Debord and the Situationist Internationale movement deserve to be credited
with yet another tremendous power of prediction. The author of The Society of
the Spectacle and Situationist Intemationale have carried on a major attack on
the legitimacy of intellectual property rights, based on notions of creativity as
leisure and self-fulfillment. Debord has constructed intellectual property as the
very fundamental economic and political institution of the spectacle: "The
language of the spectacle is made of the signs of the dominating production.
Such signs are at the same time the ultimate aim of such production. 9 "As
indispensable decoration of the objects that are actually produced, as general
claim of the rationality of the system, as leading economic sector that directly
produces an increasing variety of objects-images, the spectacle is the main
production of present society. ' ' 92 In Debord's theory the "spectacle has created
a monopoly on what appears." 93  By annulling historical knowledge and
developing explanations based on structuralism as a sort of science of the
necessity, it has incorporated in itself even the most radical critique.94 Critique
becomes establishment, false becomes true. Critical thinking, in order to wake
society up from the passive state in which the spectacle keeps it, has only one
way to act-subvert the domain of the original and of the copy: "in the world
really subverted the truth is a moment of the false." 95
90. Notice that the major South African defeat of imperialistic notions of intellectual property in South
Africa happened within a "group oriented" cultural model, in which individualistic ideology is less capable of
persuasion. See Kevin D. Brown, Globalization and Cultural Conflict in Developing Countries: The South
African Example, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225, 252 (1999).
91. See DEBORD, supra note 39, at 55.
92. Id. at 57.
93. Id. at 56.
94. Id. at 172.
95. Id. at 55.
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Such liberating, subversive theory has to be accompanied by a variety of
practices. In the domain of culture and intellectual creativity, the main
revolutionary practice is called detournement. The essence of such practice is
the denial and radical refutation of any form of intellectual property: "Ideas
improve. The sense of words participated in such improvement. Plagiarism is
necessary. Progress requires it. Plagiarism siezes the phrase of an author, uses
its expressions, cancels a false idea, substitutes it with a true one ...
detournement is the opposite of the citation, of the theoretical authority which is
always falsified for the very fact of having been cited....96
As early as 1967, anticipating and radicalizing many of the post-modernist
themes such as hybridization and utilization out of the context of the legacy of
the past,97 Gui Debord had developed a theoretical and political challenge of
intellectual property as a political institution of the global society. Debord's
critique of the political functions of intellectual property law precedes most of
the counter-hegemonic themes of the so-called "copyleft" movement by more
than thirty years.
The idea of "copyleft," like Debord's detournemet, plays with words. Left
is opposed to right as a political signal,9 but left also means abandoned,
dropped, given-conveying the sense of free relinquishment and spread of
ideas as opposed to copyrighted materials severely and fiercely defended as a
property right by the institutions of the global society. The copyleft movement
can certainly be perceived as a counter-hegemonic trend, made possible by
those very same technological innovations (mainly the internet) that function as
a powerful hegemonic force behind Western (and particularly U.S., as the
United States alone owns fifty-one percent of world's patents) capitalism. The
idea of "open source" dates back to 1984 when the M.I.T. informatics scholar
Richard Stallman created the "Free Software Foundation" in order to facilitate
free access to the code sources that keep the secrets behind the functioning of
software. Many of the political and social concerns of copyleft were already
96. Id. at 74.
97. Deleuze and Guattari play extensively with notions of in context and out of context. See generally
GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM & SCHIZOPHRENIA (Robert Hurley et al.
trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1983) (1972) (offering classic discussions in different contexts) [hereinafter
ANTI-OEDIPUS]; GILLES DELEUZE & FILIx GUATTARI, MILLE PLATEAUX: CAPITALISME ET SCHIZOPHRENIE
(1980); see also DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURAL CHANGE (1989).
98. This concept of "play" is an unmistakably deconstructive gesture. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA,
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1972); JACQUES DERRIDA,
MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1972).
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being discussed as early as 1975 within the mythical Silicon Valley
"Homebrew Club," a group of socially concerned young scholars that at the
dawn of the computer era were already worried about the fate of technological
innovation in the hands of the big corporate business. Nevertheless, it was only
in the early 1990s that the Finnish student Linus Thovalds launched Linux, the
most successful and threatening concurrent of Windows, freely available on the
Internet and used today by some eighteen million computers in the world.
Linux, constantly and openly improved by its users, who reciprocate free use
with suggestions for improvement and problem solving, is based on a clearly
anti-copyright philosophy and can be seen as a living demonstration of the
ideological nature of pro-copyright rhetoric of innovation.99
Other major examples of the counter-hegemonic use of the internet can be
found in programs such as Napster which, although eventually enjoined by U.S.
courts of law, has developed within the teenage community (and among many
artists fed up with being exploited by mega-producers) the idea that music is
and should be freely available on the internet. Open Cola has recently provided
an example of an "open" product that is that can be copied and improved, in
clear antagonism with the highly secretive practice of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-
Cola corporations. In the domain of culture and knowledge, Wikipedia, an
open internet encyclopedia, allows anybody to improve and add entries, now
displaying some 20,000 entries and constantly growing. Finally and most
recently is the "open brief' philosophy behind Professor Lawrence Lessig's
attempt to challenge the excessive duration of copyrights (between fifty and
seventy years after the author's death) in a suit on behalf of the online publisher
Eldritch Press. 100 Professor Lessig is using the legal creativity of U.S. law
students from major universities in order to frame the best possible arguments
against the excessive duration of copyright law.
VI. HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
American legal hegemony can be much better seen (and is much more
important) as a change in legal consciousness than as a pattern of
99. See generally LINUS TORVALDS & DAVID DIAMOND, JUST FOR FUN: THE STORY OF AN ACCIDENTAL
REVOLUTIONARY (200 1) (explaining the history of the development of Linux and open source platforms); see
also generally GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: THE INSIDE STORY OF LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE
REVOLUTION (2001).
100. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 534
U.S. 1126, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
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transplantation of legal rules. Legal reception is a highly creative activity, l °"
and legal transplants would be severely misunderstood in their nature if they
were approached only as a mechanical import-export exercise. 1 2 Much more
important is to monitor the diffusion of professional ways of thinking about the
law and to address such major intellectual changes as results of the ideological
apparatuses of global governance.
0 3
It is important to discuss examples of Americanization (and of counter-
hegemony) at a deep fundamental level of the legal system. By following
patterns of changes between sources of law in the last two decades, we should
be able to see whether and to what extent legal globalization can be seen as a
pattern of legal Americanization. We should be able to conclude that American
law in "contexts of reception" is so different from American law in the "context
of production ' 4 that a universal notion of "imperial law" is necessary to
capture the present situation of law in the global context. Notions of legal
globalization territorially connected with specific, state-based "contexts of
production" (e.g. French Law, German Law, U.S. law) are less useful in
perceiving the nature of the post-Cold War legal order. They are too much
connected with territorial approaches to comparative law that are now in the
process of being reconsidered as a consequence of the powerful birth of
institutions of legal globalization (such as the WTO, IMF, EU, and so forth). 10 5
Legal systems do not agree on what the formal sources of the law are. For
comparative purposes, nevertheless, this disagreement is just another area of
comparison, while an agreement has been reached that the relevant sources of
law for comparative purposes are not necessarily formal sources of law within
the technical meaning of a specific legal system. 0 6 I will explore the present
phase of globalization/Americanization in three fundamental places: legal
101. See GRANDE, supra note 8; see also Pier Giuseppe Monateri & F.A. Chiaves, Shifing Frames: Law
and Legal "'Contaminations, " in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 21 (Jeffrey Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).
102. Considering the law as a mechanical commodity that can be imported or exported like a television set
or a Land Rover is also a strategy of governance. See Ugo Mattei, Legal Transplants, Legal Pluralism and
Economic Development, in NEW LAWS FOR NEW STATES (L. Favali et al. eds., 1999); see also LAURA
NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2002).
103. See generally Mathias Reimann, Droit positif et culture juridique: L "amdricanisation du droit
europ4en par reception, 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROrr 61 (2001) (discussing Americanization as a
change of mentality).
104. This important notion is introduced by Medina, supra note 3.
105. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Towards a European Civil Code: Why ContinentalJurists Should Consult
Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1337 (1999); see also MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, LE
ISTITUZIONI DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE: DIRITTO E DIRITII NELLA SOCIETk TRANSNAZIONALE (2001)
(discussing the legal institutions of globalization).
106. See generally Sacco, supra note 23.
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scholarship, case law, and codification. If I succeed in offering evidence of a
deep and pervasive impact on intimate and traditionally local aspects of the law,
the idea of "imperial law" as the outcome of such processes should become
even more persuasive.
This section focuses mainly on the impact of Law and Economics, a highly
influential approach to law in the contemporary process of making European
private law, as well as one of the most influential scholarly approaches within
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.10 7 The reader should
keep in mind that when a new paradigm of legal scholarship is able to seize a
leading position, it is usually by making previous approaches look obsolete and
primitive. An example is the French exegetic methodology, which was
considered obsolete by the much more elegant and scientific German-Pandectist
approach. The Franco-German-inspired social approach, advertised as a step
forward in civilization compared to the previous "Lochner-Era" individualism,
may have also become the leading position in this way. This is certainly the
case in present U.S. hegemony, offering an expansive universalistic global
model that expresses itself in English (the new lingua franca), that keeps a
dialogue open with economics (the queen of social sciences), and that claims to
be the new natural legal order of the post-Westphalian state society based on
imperial law. Such a legal system, short of being politically legitimized,
receives its legitimacy and desirability by the intrinsic virtues of general access
to the global capitalist market place, a dream spelled out at the front door of the
luxurious building of the World Bank in D.C.: "We Dream of a World Free
from Poverty."
Imperial law, as short of being a mode of governance in need of legitimacy
as any other, becomes the technological backbone of the global market-
something to be approached apolitically, to be described and modified only by
technological practices. For the first time after the Cold War, funding is
available for scholars who wish to be the technocrats and the engineers of this
apolitical system. Within these assumptions, any approach to the law that still
considers it as a political institution that cannot be understood and described in
graphs and numbers is disposed of as obsolete, and any approach that requires
something other than a reactive minimal philosophy of governance is entirely
out of fashion after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Law has to create incentives for
107. Cf. generally M. W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (2001) (discussing changes in
current private law thinking in Europe). See also Reimann, supra note 103 (indicating a more nuanced
position).
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market actors. The skilled lawyer and policymaker is not appreciated if his
suggestions require a proactive and expensive activist posture of governments,
let alone if he argues for economic redistribution by taxation or other obsolete
Keynesian measures. The legal scholar can count only on the natural existence
of markets: his role is to produce a correct set of market incentives. The
quintessential example of this attitude is the celebrated "self-sufficient" model
of corporate reform produced by leading Columbia University scholar Bernard
Black (now at Stanford Law School) for the Russian Federation. 0 8
The institutional background of U.S. law was the highly original context in
which the legal process, the first genuinely original paradigm of American legal
scholarship, developed its analysis.' 09 The United States is the only generally
federalized judicial system in the world. U.S. law, therefore, has to cope with a
number of unique potential conflicts between institutional actors, something
that naturally makes lawyers develop a tremendously sophisticated
consciousness on the practical importance, in litigation, of who decides what." 0
Within U.S. legal culture, the unprecedented degree of anti-formalist
hegemony experienced by American legal realism called for some reaction. In
Germany and France, the two leading exponents of the civil law tradition, anti-
formalism has never successfully reached beyond the status of a critical current
of legal thought, only marginally influential outside of legal scholarship. " ' On
the contrary, in the United States, legal realism was able to seize the leading
posture among legal approaches in academia and also, not marginally, in the
judiciary and the administrative state.l2
The reaction to legal realism, produced by the legal process school mainly
in public law and by the economic analysis of law in private law, had no
foreign models by which to be inspired. If seen in the domestic perspective of
108. See generally Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996).
109. See generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1994) (reviving attention
to the legal process school of thought); see also generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (discussing the merger of legal
process theory and law and economics). Predating the legal process school, the roots of both legal formalism
and legal realism can be traced to Europe. See Kennedy, supra note 34.
110. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed.
1996) (discussing the other "classic" of the legal process school); see also generally Akhil Reed Amar, Law
Story, 102 HARv. L. REV. 688 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3rd ed. 1988)).
111. See Carlo Augusto Cannata & Antonio Gambaro, 2 LNEAMENTI DI STORIA DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA
EUROPEA: DAL MEDIOEVO ALLEPOCA CONTEMPORANEA (4th ed. 1989).
112. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 105-10 (1984) (appraising the realist hegemony in U.S. law).
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U.S. law, both the legal process and the economic analysis of law share an
ambiguous relationship with formalism and realism. It would be difficult to
imagine the birth of the legal process outside of the very peculiar U.S. federal
system, while, because of the nature of economic reasoning, the economic
analysis of law is a universalistic paradigm. As a consequence of this different
degree of local specificity, only law and economics has been able to become a
world-wide hegemonic form of legal consciousness.
While it would a gross exaggeration to claim that law and economics today
enjoys the leading role as an approach to legal scholarship in European
countries, we can nevertheless see that it is the main intellectual vehicle used by
American legal consciousness to diffuse itself and to impose its hegemony in
the center and periphery of the world.1 3 The notoriously expansionistic and
universalistic blend of neoclassical economic analysis, together with the very
thick layer of ideological assumptions that are imbedded in economic reasoning
and that produce the development of the evolution towards economic efficiency
as a sort of second nature, are all behind the intellectual success of this line of
reasoning about the law."14 A very clear bias in favor of the efficiency of the
common law adjudication process promotes the reactive posture of the courts of
law as the normative philosophy of U.S. academic discourse. Privatizations
and structural reforms, sustained by the international institutions of global
governance, make law and economics one of the most important cultural
currents that diffuse tacit assumptions of U.S.-based imperial legal
consciousness.
Law and economics, once transplanted outside of its context of production,
displays the high level of ambiguity that allows it to flourish. Conservative
scholars admire its intellectual elegance; more progressive and liberal scholars
see its potential in subverting the highly formalistic and black letter flavor of
local law, and claim that the conservative political bias is something that can be
left on the other side of the ocean." 5 Many European scholars are attracted to
law and economics, and even when attempting to use it critically, are paving the
113. Ugo Mattei & Alberto Monti, Comparative Law and Economics: Borrowing and Resistance, in 1
GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2001), at www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol l/iss2/art5/.
114. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 1, at 465.
115. See generally F. Pulitini, Appunti sull' analisi economica del diritto, I MERCATO CONCORRENZA E
REGOLE (forthcoming 2003) (critical appraisal by an early Italian scholar of law and economics of the
opportunity to consider Chicago and other brands of Law and Economics as movements sharing enough
communalities to be approached within a unitary taxonomic scheme).
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way to scholarly Americanization and becoming part of the very same world
phenomenon of hegemonic imposition that they would like to criticize.
The distinctive American flavor of law and economics leaves open a
fundamental question: what is the legitimacy of a scholarly paradigm when
applied outside of the cultural context in which it has been developed? What
are the political implications of using law and economics outside of the cultural
environment in which it has developed? Is a new legitimacy necessary for the
context of reception, or is the one captured in its original environment also
sufficient for the new one? It is urgent that such critical questions are
approached within a broad historical context, in which present trends are not
taken for granted and in which local specificities are fully appreciated in their
political meaning. Such a critical exercise is even more needed if law and
economics aims at establishing itself, as discussed in the previous sections, as
one of the fundamental methodologies of the new imperial legal order.
Recent scholarship" 16 has pointed out that law and economics has entered a
post-modem, interpretive phase of development in which its nature of a grand
discourse over the nature of law aiming at objectivity has yielded to a local
micro-strategy grounded in pragmatism. Using such strategy, legal scholarship
pursues hegemony and influence over the other sources of U.S. law by means
of a radically neo-pragmatist attitude. Such critical development has been
fostered by a general loss of faith in the objectivity of efficiency-based
discourses, the very same faith that in previous times had guaranteed to law and
economics, and to economics in general, their hegemony within the post-realist
approach to legal scholarship and within other social sciences.1 7 Such
evolution can be seen in all its fundamental importance from the perspective of
legitimacy of the legal discourse, if one takes into consideration that the quest
for objectivity had already been at the roots of the legal process school in the
fifties." 8 In the United States today, law and economics has been finally
unseated from the throne of legal objectivity, so that its normative recipes need
a new contingent and local legitimization in order to compete with those of a
variety of opposite political strategies.
116. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END (1995); see also generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN
G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM (1997).
117. See generally Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the
Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1260 (1982).
118. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
I (1959) (advocating judicial review after careful evaluation of other possible solutions to the issue at hand).
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The traditional grand theory of law and economics has been successfully
received and implemented by the new all-powerful producers of global law, the
private and public international institutions of global governance (the WTO,
World Bank, IMF, mega-law firms, and so forth). In this institutional scenario,
successfully described recently as Empire 19 or as Polyarchy promotion, 120 even
lively scholarly debates happening only in one place (however hegemonic such
as the United States) cannot help but be parochial and ineffective, particularly
as far as the voices of intellectual resistance and critique are concerned. The
emerged false opposition-between a global dimension, which is the domain of
the market and of efficient institutions, and a local dimension as the location of
solidarity and politics-requires a genuinely cosmopolitan legal culture to be
exposed and challenged.
As pointed out in a recent essay, traditional comparative law is particularly
ill-equipped to tackle the critical analysis necessary in order to study and
understand the "new" legal systems of the global world, those non-territorial
suppliers of law that characterize the present landscape (WTO, IMF, and so
forth).121 Indeed, traditional comparative law is prisoner of a territorial national
paradigm of inquiry that is all but dead as a tool for understanding legal
globalization. Thus, in order for the comparativist to become an effective
global lawyer, it is necessary to rethink radically the modem idea of borders.
Tools must be invented to compare non-territorial legal systems between
themselves as well as with territorial ones.
The a-critical reception of law and economics, with its grand discursive
strategy based on efficiency and objectivity, then becomes the ideological
apparatus of global authority. Alternatively, when eventually (if at any point)
the post-modem vein of U.S. law and economics becomes understood, the
reception will remain embedded in postmodemism, "the logic by which global
capital operates.
1 22
In the United States, despite a number of contradictory characters,
postmodernist legal paradigms have been able to "develop as a radical critique
of both formalist and realist paradigms competing with each other for cultural
hegemony in the legal academy ... [by challenging] the American dream, the
119. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 10, at xi-xii (defining Empire as the political subject that regulates
global markets and global circuits of production).
120. See ROBINSON, supra note 9.
121. See generally Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International
Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2001).
122. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 10, at 151.
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realist market pragmatism, and the simplifying assumptions of the leading
paradigms of research.' 23 Even setting aside here the devastating impact of
economic modernization, carried on by means of western conceptions of the
law in societies that have followed different paths of development, 24 it is clear
that outside of the American cultural and institutional context, legal phenomena
are quite different. For example, in the European legal landscape, still
possessed by the self-serving formalist and localized attitude of the legal
discourse, there is a need to introduce some values of modernity rather than to
entertain postmodernist critique. A number of pre-modem aspects of European
society still strike the observer. For example, formalism, a value symbolizing
class division, has never been replaced by informality and openness. Hence in
Europe, postmodernism reinforces the pre-modern status quo, even at a
superficial level of analysis. From a cultural perspective, it legitimizes the
forces opposing radical institutional remodeling of legislatures, courts, and
scholarship such as those needed in order to counterbalance American legal
hegemony.
Interestingly, the influence of American scholarly thought in the law, as
applied to such a highly political exercise as the building of the new European
legal landscape, shows even more division and more need to distinguish
differences of attitude in the process of reception. A wide gap between
northern and Latin European countries in attitude towards the reception of
American-inspired modes of thought about the law is too apparent to be
neglected. Northern countries, including Germany, Holland, Great Britain, and
the Scandinavian countries, have incorporated much of the new American
attitude towards the legal discourse as symbolized by law and economics. In
such countries, the internalization of leading U.S. modes of thought in the law,
such as balancing jurisprudence (including law and economics), has
tremendously increased in the last ten years. The "new European legal
culture," mostly made by scholars belonging to such northern countries where
the university system does not live in a state of disarray, and in which law
professors are mostly full time scholars or (some of them) policymakers, is
123. Ugo Mattei & Anna di Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and
International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1053, 1085-86 (2001).
124. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA (1980) (analyzing and critiquing American legal assistance in the developing world with
special emphasis on Latin America); see also generally David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1975) (examining the relationship between the legal system and the social, economic, and
political changes occurring in Third World countries).
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much more similar to U.S. legal culture than to the traditional European one. 25
This new European legal culture, dominated by northern scholars able to
express themselves in English, is the most influential in European private law
drafting. The outcome of such northern reception is a technological attitude
towards the legal discourse, traditionally foreign to the European style and very
functional to the legitimizing strategy of non-politically accountable techno-
bureaucratic elites within the European Commission.
Nevertheless, legal Europe is not made only by northern, Anglophone
elites. A variety of resisting attitudes can be shown too, particularly in southern
Latin countries resenting their marginalized status in the exercise of building
European law. Such Latin counter-cultures are occasionally originated simply
by the cultural incapacity to participate in policy-oriented discussions about the
law, because leading lawyers in those countries are still the product of a highly
formalistic interpretive culture. Sometimes, such resisting attitudes are due to
the still notable strength of the "social mode of thought about the law" which
leads to the belief that the neo-American model carries with it reactionary
eighteenth-century models of capitalism. 26 Indeed the early resistance against
law and economics in Europe was politically motivated by that same belief,
even in Northern European countries.127 A third mode of resistance with clear
ambitions of counter-hegemony is unfolding within the critical comparative law
community by the use of historiography, anthropology, and neo-institutional
economics. Such an emerging comparative community, 128 directly connected
with U.S. critical scholars 129 and with European critical philosophy,130 is
carrying on a genuine attempt to exploit the "subversive function" of
comparative law in order to take advantage of the much more cosmopolitan
125. See HESSELINK, supra note 107; see also text accompanying notes 107-15.
126. See Anna di Robilant, Globalization of the Social? An Italian Counter-Fire, 11 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L.
(forthcoming) (noting the importance of the "social achievements" of the European legal tradition such as the
"social function" of property rights that has been abandoned in the socially inspired European Charter of
Rights). See generally ANDREA MANZELLA, RISCRIVERE I DIRIII IN EUROPA: LA CARTA DE1 DIRIlTI
FONDAMENTALI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA (2001).
127. For an account of the early reception of law and economics in Europe, see Robert Cooter & J. Gordley,
Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future, 11 INT'L REV L. & ECON 261 (1991).
128. Among the important contributions, see Horatia Muir Watt, La Fonction Subversive du Droit
Comparg, 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 503 (2000); HESSELINK, supra note 107; P.G.
Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the "Western Legal Tradition", 51
HASTINGS L.J. 479 (2000); Mauro Bussani, Choix et Difis deL 'hermneutiqueJuridique Notes Minimes, 50
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 735 (1998); GRANDE, supra note 8.
129. See Symposyum: CriticalLegal Studies in Europe, 9 EUR REV. PRIVATE L (2001); Elisabetta Grande,
Introduction to LAURA NADER, LE FORZE VIVE DEL DIRITTO (2002).
130. See DIRITTO, GIUSTIZIA E NTERPRETAZIONE (Jacques Derrida & Gianni Vattimo eds., 1998).
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flavor of minority European legal cultures, which have been forced by political
necessity to look beyond localism and to develop worldly approaches to the
legal discourse.13' Such approaches are particularly interested in opening a
channel of exchange with the traditional periphery, with particular sensitivity to
the issues of Islam, boundaries, and exclusion.
VII. COURTS AS AGENCIES OF U.S. HEGEMONY
As discussed above, U.S. law has been able to receive and to "exaggerate"
from Germany and from England, the two main agencies of professional check
over the political process: legal scholarship and the judiciary. Both of these
agencies, entrusted with considerable political power, have no purse, are
inspired by a reactive philosophy, and are ill-equipped for any proactive re-
distributive role. A universalistic notion of rights, received from the French
naturalistic tradition, has also been exaggerated in the United States. This
section explores the hegemonic consequences of a universal discourse on rights
enforced by a strong system of courts. 132  It further dwells on the global
consequences of the reactive philosophy in contexts in which courts do not
operate as effectively as the American ones in the enforcement of rights.
While the development of a leading legal scholarship in the United States is
a relatively recent accomplishment, 133 the development of an all-powerful
judiciary in charge of many policy decisions was noticed quite early by Alexis
de Tocqueville. 134  Naturally, scholars are those who provide consent to
131. The idea of a subversive function of comparative law has been advanced by George Fletcher. See
generally George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. LAW 683
(1998). This approach attempts to create a potential "new-global" way of thinking about the law stemming
from a Latin (or more generally Mediterranean) resistance to the status quo and incrementally transforming it
into an effective counter-hegemonic force. Whether this is a reality or only the projection of the present
author is an open question. Nevertheless, some common patterns of analysis are emerging and they certainly
include the relentless critique of universalizing human rights approaches, the constant attention to minority
jurisdictions, the de-legitimization of the leading Euro-American focus of comparative legal and political
analysis, the issue of linguistic diversity, the struggle against arrogance and chauvinism in legal scholarship,
and the constant effort to expose hidden assumptions able to create "a second nature" and capable of hiding
political choices behind technocratic skills. Similarly, a call for subversive practice is a dominant theme in
continental philosophy. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BASIC WRITINGS: FROM BEING AND TIME (1927
TO THE TASK OF THINKING) (David Farrell Krell ed., 1977) (1964).
132. See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj~m Vallinder eds.,
1995).
133. The date of birth of the American inspired legal globalization is after World War II's aftermath. See
Mattei, Why the Wind Changed, supra note 24; Kennedy, supra note 34.
134. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 27.
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scholarly hegemony. When we shift our attention to U.S. courts as agencies of
hegemony, we are faced with the problem of detecting the agents of agreement
to such a hegemonic role. My claim here is that the plaintiffs' bar is playing
such a role and that, again, the last decade has shown significant changes. In
other words, while courts of law have been a strong and very influential
institutional branch throughout U.S. legal history, it is only in this last decade
that they have started to perform a major global hegemonic role.
The story of courts of law as hegemonic agencies of the global legal order
began unfolding in post-World War II developments, and reached its final stage
in post-Cold War jurisprudence. The Holocaust played a direct role in both of
these phases.135 In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Nuremberg
trial planted the seeds of an idea of international legality based on special courts
of law, with a mode of faith in the judiciary. While the notion of courts capable
of enforcing universal human rights is certainly rooted in the Nuremberg
trial, 136 the idea that the national system of U.S. courts of law can provide this
role worldwide is a post-Cold War development, with the U.S. Holocaust-
related litigation as its central drama. 13
7
As is well known, numerous lawsuits have been filed in U.S. federal and
state courts asserting what are now commonly referred to as "Holocaust
claims." In these claims for events arising out of World War II, plaintiffs
maintain that the wrongs alleged-which include concealed bank accounts,
looted assets, looted art, and insurance policy claims-are best adjudicated by
U.S. courts because various procedural mechanisms of the U.S. judicial system
allow efficient disposition of the claims. Each case involves stories about still-
living plaintiffs, or their friends and family, being either brutally subjected to
Nazi horror during the war (looted asset and slave labor claims), or
unscrupulously denied access to their legal entitlements after the war (insurance
and bank deposit claims). Commissions have been authorized and funded in
Switzerland, France, and the United States' to pursue the question. 139
135. See Kennedy, supra note 34.
136. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE (1988). See also
generally David Held, International Law, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 42, at
167.
137. The following section is based on my previous work with Jeffrey Lena. See Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey S.
Lena, United States Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United States: Some Hegemonic
Implications, 1 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS (2001), at http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol 1/iss2/art5/.
138. Two studies under the direction of Stuart Eizenstat focused public attention on the issue and added
political pressure to reach settlements in many of the cases brought. STUART EIZENSTAT & WILLIAM Z.
SLANY, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR
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Substantial and factually non-frivolous claims have also been filed in U.S.
courts by both U.S. and foreign nationals for forced labor and sexual slavery
imposed by the Japanese in the Pacific Theatre of the war.
The U.S. Constitution, drafted in 1787, reflects the natural law beliefs that
dominated eighteenth-centuryjurisprudence. A primary tenet of that belief was
the recognition, preservation, and vindication of individual rights, whether they
arose in the United States or abroad. The framers and the first generation to
follow them gave substance to that belief, in part through the idea that
international law could be seen as a system of customary protection of such
rights. This principle was reflected in Article III of the Constitution itself,
which, while concerned with limiting federal jurisdiction vis-A-vis the state
courts of the United States, broadly interpreted the notion of cases "arising
under the Constitution ... [and] ... the Laws of the United States" to include
international law claims based not only upon treaties, but upon custom as well.
The U.S. Constitution also granted "alienage"jurisdiction in all cases between
"a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or Subjects." This
set the stage for the expansive vision of federal court authority in all areas that
touched on foreign affairs. 140  Congress further extended subject matter
jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts through passage of the Alien Tort Statute,
part of the original Judiciary Act of 1789. While originally more restrictive in
scope and practical use, that statute, today codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." The origins of the Act remain somewhat obscure
and, for almost 200 years, the statute lay practically dormant. But the statute
suddenly came to life in the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 141 in which the
HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY (1997), available at http://
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/asetindx.htm; STUART EIZENSTAT & WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. AND ALLIED
WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN,
AND TURKEY ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF
THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY (1998).
139. A substantial amount of literature has emerged on the question. See, e.g., RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF,
PACK OF THIEVES: HOW HITLER AND EUROPE PLUNDERED THE JEWS AND COMMITTED THE GREATEST
THEFT IN HISTORY (1999); MARK AARONS & JOHN LOFTUS, UNHOLY TRINITY: HOW THE VATICAN'S NAZI
NETWORKS BETRAYED WESTERN INTELLIGENCE TO THE SOVIETS (1992).
140. The logic behind the federal courts taking original jurisdiction over these matters was to ensure that the
matters would be heard, to the greatest extent possible, in federal as opposed to state courts, on the theory that
the federal sovereign, having been vested with sole power over foreign relations, should also have jurisdiction
over matters concerning the law of nations. This effectively limited state court jurisdiction, which was in all
respects not limited by the federal Constitution.
141. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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court held that the act complained of-torture of a Paraguay citizen by a
Paraguay official acting under color of law-violated the "law of nations" that,
according to Article III of the Constitution, was directly incorporated into
federal common law. 142 Thus, the embryonic but clear potential for U.S. courts
of law to vindicate wrongs committed throughout the world, and thereby protect
the natural rights of the world's individuals, was finally given expression. Such
jus cogens violations of natural rights conflicting with clearly established norms
of international law can and do happen everywhere in the world, in theory
transforming the United States into a forum for all the world's grievances. 4
3
Such potential world-wide jurisdiction of the American judiciary has been
historically balanced by a number of countervailing principles, such as the
doctrine of "minimum contacts" and the constitutional doctrine of
"justiciability." Other doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, have been
elaborated by U.S. courts to safeguard the principle of their jurisdiction while
simultaneously refusing to keep jurisdiction when it is more proper to have the
litigation unfold outside the United States. While employment of the doctrine
is not uniform among state courts, some uniformity has developed on the
federal level after the Supreme Court wrote extensively on the topic in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 144 Nevertheless, a forum non conveniens decision by a
trial court remains based upon a balancing of interests and the decision remains
within the "sound discretion" of the court.
Beginning in 1996, the impressive explosion of Holocaust-related litigation
provided world-wide visibility to this phenomenon.145  Indeed, European
lawyers representing a large number of Europe-based corporations active in the
insurance, banking, and industry are today involved in one capacity or another
in litigation on both coasts of the United States concerning hundreds of claims
based on facts that occurred more than a half century ago. Because of the
142. This, ofcourse was not a new idea. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820) ("The
common law ... recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own municipal code, but as an
offence against the law of nations .... ). The development is described in JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996).
143. One of the reasons that the use of international law as a basis for asserting claims under Federal
Common Law was slow to develop was that general consensus as to what might be considered a violation of a
jus cogens norm only developed in the second half of the Twentieth Century. See lwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439-40 (D.N.J. 1999) (describing the growing consensus as to what constitutes a
violation ofajus cogens norm); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102(2), 702
(1986).
144. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
145. See Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34
U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000) (detailing the various holocaust cases from the plaintiff's perspective).
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distance of the Holocaust from the United States,1 46 and because of the nature
of judicial challenge to actions carried on under shadow of foreign law and
politics, the holocaust litigation is the most extreme and emblematic episode of
a world-wide trend in international litigation in which U.S. courts promote
themselves as de facto judges of world history.
In addition to the emotional implications of such litigation, which requires
us to relive one of the most horrible tragedies in recorded history, the holocaust-
related litigation seems an indictment of the very activist jurisdictional posture
of the U.S. courts. Such posture is now resented as a major phenomenon of
legal imperialism because of the way in which it imposes American standards
not only of substantive law (which are, with respect to these appalling events, in
any case largely shared by most nations in the world), but also of procedure and
of legal culture. In particular, the pro-plaintiff (relative to the rest of the world)
attitude of United States procedure, which has already created so many
problems, 147 may impose standards that offend the legal sensibilities of non-
American lawyers. Interestingly, none of the almost five hundred Holocaust
related actions filed in U.S. federal or state courts (with the exception of one
important insurance holocaust claim and one French bank claim) 148 have ever
reached the stage of a full-fledged decision on the comprehensive "motion to
dismiss.'
' 49
146. From another perspective it may be noted that not uncommonly plaintiffs are persons who were once
citizens of some European country and subsequently became U.S. citizens. Like any country's courts, U.S.
courts would like to offer a forum to their own citizens. This does not change the fact, however, that the
events themselves took place generations ago, on another continent, when the plaintiff was the citizen of
another country.
147. For example, the disputes that arose during the Evidence Convention negotiations at the Hague
Conference of Private International law. The best and most accessible discussion of this remains
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 32, at 470-75.
148. Stem v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., (No. BC 185376) (California State Court insurance claim filed
in 1999) (Jurisdiction asserted, after which the case was settled); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d
117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (motion to dismiss in bank account case on standing, comity, and statute of limitations
grounds denied and case allowed to proceed); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187
(C.D.Cal. 2001) (court denied motion to dismiss on grounds of full sovereign immunity).
149. The "Motion to Dismiss" in United States Federal Procedure occurs at an initial stage of the litigation
in which defendants may raise a number of initial defenses including: statute of limitations, failure to state a
claim, non-justiciability, comity, lack of standing to sue, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
jurisdiction, and others under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (Rule 12). State Courts, though they do not
follow the Federal Rules, have similar procedural mechanisms for challenging plaintiffs' claims. Rule 12
motions can be brought successively as the case develops. So, for example, where a first motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction fails, if additional facts develop indicating that the court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, that defense may be reasserted.
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Even at the earliest stages, nevertheless, plaintiffs will ask the court to
allow them some limited discovery, usually related to jurisdictional matters. 5o
The stunning reach of U.S. discoverys t is one of the most important factors
explaining the present hegemony of U.S. law in world-wide litigation.
American-style discovery, often experienced by defendants as a "fishing
expedition," is traditionally very much resented in European countries, as is
well-documented by Article 13 of the Hague Evidence Convention, which
allows signatory countries to decline to cooperate in matters of American-style
discovery. Even the early stage is complicated, time consuming, and very
expensive. For example, in a complex international litigation involving issues
of foreign law, a rather extensive role of expert witnesses might be involved.
Not only do issues of law have to be addressed by expert declarations, but
litigants must also address factual questions that might require expensive
declarations as well (e.g. by historians, bankers, experts of business practice,
and the like, who typically have to be hired and compensated). Moreover, the
responsible attorney must absorb, to a great extent, the impact of the foreign
law on the case and be prepared to argue it both in the briefs and at oral
argument. Since each point of law in the motion to dismiss has to be
thoroughly briefed-involving massive searches of the case law for helpful
precedent-a large number of attorneys are typically involved in various
capacities, who are compensated at rates usually ranging from $200 to $500
dollars per hour. It is no exaggeration to estimate that that resisting even an
entirely spurious claim involving complex international litigation in the United
States might cost a defendant not less than one million dollars per year. This
"third factor"-the high cost of litigation-in part explains the high rate of out-
of-court settlements.
Besides discovery, other difficulties exist, such that suits in U.S. courts put
high financial pressure on defendants. To begin with, the system of attorney's
compensation is, at least in tort cases, very attractive for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs'
attorneys are usually compensated on a contingency basis. Defense attorneys,
on the other hand, are typically compensated on an hourly basis, which is
typically less lucrative compared to the cases that end in a plaintiff s windfall,
150. Presently the federal "default" discovery rules provide that the parties must exchange relevant merits-
related documents at the outset of the proceedings; where jurisdictional defenses are raised, however,
defendants may seek relief from such initial document exchange.
151. FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
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but which constitutes a more certain form of compensation.15 2 For the plaintiff,
suing in a U.S. court is a "risk free, no cash advance" enterprise. This would be
impossible in any other jurisdiction, due to restrictions in the availability of
contingency fee agreements. Tort law in the United States has been very
creative in terms of doctrines employed to extend liability to defendants. One
need only think of the "market share liability" concept first employed in the
pharmaceutical class action setting.153
A second feature of the system is, of course, the availability of punitive
damages. A third is the employment of the jury to determine liability and
damages. Jurors tend to be sympathetic with victims, adopting a "rough
equity" approach, and are sometimes quite liberal with standards of proof.1
5 4
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the vehicle of the class action, which
allows "representative" plaintiffs to pursue the action on behalf of a "plaintiff
class," is one of the most powerful attractions of a U.S. forum. Sometimes
litigation in the United States is the only vehicle available for vindication of
these kinds of rights. And this is indeed one of the strongest rhetorical reasons
for the hegemony of American law in the international context. The class
action is a technical device that allows relatively small individual interests that
could never afford the costs of litigation to aggregate, forming a large and
structured interest strong enough to attract plaintiffs lawyers to litigate the
claims. Invariably, the winning strategy for plaintiffs opposing forum non
conveniens motions is to show that the interest that is litigated as a class action
in the United States could never find access to courts anywhere else in the
world because of the lack of the class action as a tool.
55
152. In the so-called "fairness hearings" under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), courts are required to determine
whether the compensation of class action attorneys is a fair and reasonable sum. While the typical contingent
fee is thirty percent before trial and forty percent after trial, compensation to attorneys in the holocaust
litigation has hovered between one and three percent. Such compensation has been approved as "fair" as far
as we can determine. There is no question, on the other hand, that the exposure engendered by these cases is
surely beneficial to acquiring future business.
153. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION 671-711 (1996).
154. See, for a pro-defendant perspective, STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW (1989); PETERW. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
Overgenerosity of the jury in favor of plaintiffs is one of the main indictments of the present tort system. See
generally LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2002). Throughout this
book but particularly in the last chapter, "The Plaintiff: A User Theory," Nader fundamentally challenges the
soundness of these critiques and points at their ideological nature.
155. The idea that only courts can vindicate rights is based on an idea that naturalizes the American
institutional (reactive) setting. The argument works on the assumption that proactive institutions such as
administrative agencies and other apparatuses, grounded in thick conceptions of the State, simply cannot
effectively protect holocaust victims, the environment, or monitor the pharmaceutical business. But indeed
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When an international class action is initiated in the United States on the
basis of international law violations, a tremendously complex and expensive
procedure is initiated. Class actions are carried out on behalf of the so-called
"named plaintiffs." A "putative" class action implies that after the preliminary
issues are addressed, assuming that the motion to dismiss is denied, the class
must be "certified" in order for the "putative" class to become a recognized
one.
Because of the attractive force of the American courts for international
forum shoppers, and because of the traditional reluctance of U.S. courts
(motivated by the rhetoric of international human rights and by notions ofjus
cogens) to give up jurisdiction in favor of foreign courts, a quite interesting
phenomenon can be detected. Concepts and notions that are inherently
American become part of the common vocabulary and culture of the
international legal practice, even when it is carried on by lawyers belonging to
civil law jurisdictions.
The way choice of law is handled offers yet another glimpse into how
strength easily turns into arrogance, as well as into the unprincipled way in
which hegemonic power is exercised. As is well known by any lawyer
involved in international legal practice, the choice of substantive law might be a
crucial factor for forum shopping. American choice of law rules are considered
very advanced, and the Americans are considered world masters in the field of
private international law because the choice of law issue has always been part
of their everyday practice of the law. The American conflict of law system is
based on the fundamental idea that the legal system with the more intense
contact with the transaction should prevail. 156 It is, however, also very sensitive
to the idea that the commonalities between legal systems should be exploited in
order to obey a notion of judicial economy. 157 Hence a strong functionalist
flavor points at not bothering to belabor foreign law too much when the results
of its application would not be so different from those that would be reached by
the application of U.S. law.
The complex American litigation on international law is so far removed
from the due process standards of most non-American jurisdictions that it is
very unlikely that any court of the world would enforce most of the judgments
administrative protection has proven effective in environmental law, and it can be much less expensive to deal
with these problems proactively than to approach them in the adversarial posture of U.S. litigation.
156. See EUGEN F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 68-102 (3d ed. 2000).
157. See id. at 538.
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entered in the United States against non-American defendants for disputes that
arise abroad. In Europe, for example, we are used to a notion of due process
that is not limited to the idea that plaintiffs should have tremendously strong
tools in order to vindicate their rights. Europeans believe that the possibility of
a defendant being innocent entitles them to due process guarantees as well.
Nevertheless, many defendants in the global world have significant assets in the
United States and wish to avail themselves of business opportunities in the
there. Hence, the jurisdiction of U.S. courts is, in some sense, voluntarily
accepted by defendants for economic if not for legal reasons.
As discussed in the previous sections, the reaction to hegemonic practices
has the potential to become counter-hegemonic. Indeed, there is no lack of
evidence of such use in the United States today. Litigants contesting unfair
labor practices abroad and environmental issues of global concern are often
attracted to U.S. courts, thanks to the pro bono activity of so many social
activist groups. Nevertheless, such commendable activity ends up even more
strongly asserting the idea that U.S. courts of law are natural and effective
adjudicators of world grievances, and that they can serve as alternatives to
political struggle and revolutionary practices to make a better world. Whether
an inherently conservative judiciary can make good law for progressive
purposes is a question that remains open. U.S. courts of law might end up
serving as monitoring agencies of governments abroad, arbitrarily holding them
to standards that are very different from those respected at home.15 8
There is no system in the world in which courts of law are as effective
agencies of rights enforcement as in the United States. If decisionmaking
authority in a shrinking public domain is transferred to ineffective rights
enforcers, what follows is lawlessness and the rule of the stronger market actor.
The globalization of the reactive philosophy thus makes the periphery the ideal
marketplace for predatory and opportunistic international capital. It is already a
fact that international corporate capital is much more careful in its action within
the domestic United States than abroad. While it can always be sued
domestically, if its abusive activity is carried on abroad, jurisdictional barriers
make the possibility of being sued less certain. American courts of law keep
the power to intervene, but they do so only selectively, skilfully playing with
158. The U.S. record regarding human rights is very poor from the European perspective. The death penalty
and the Guantanamo cages are icons of such double standards. Moreover, the Florida recount saga makes it
difficult for U.S. observers to press for fair elections worldwide.
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notions of international comity when they wish not to offer an effective forum
for plaintiffs.
Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces are not active only in contexts of
reception. They appear tremendously present even in the context of production,
where the very same global economic actors struggle to make the United States
a better place for carrying on their business. The tort reform movement shows
how anti-plaintiff activity can be strong even in the United States.159 Many
recent changes in U.S. legal practice point to a reduction in the power of the
private bar in favor of more the harmonious practices of case management or
alternative dispute resolution schemes. The same forces that profit from the
reactive philosophy and from the reduction of the public domain proactively
cured by State institutions also push in favor of changes in the United States,
aimed at controlling the potential counter-hegemonic use of courts of law in
order to vindicate rights of the weak before the strong. Thus, while the
European way of thinking and rhetoric about adversarial decisionmaking
becomes more American (Italy is a very interesting example of this
phenomenon), the American one, because of the domestic impact of the "anti-
law movement," becomes more harmonious and less effective in the protection
of rights. Thus "convergence" in legal procedure in the present phase shows
the triumph of the worst of the two worlds as the dominant global model of
decisionmaking.
VIn. U.S. HEGEMONY IN THE EUROPEAN CODIFICATION PROCESS"6
In the previous two sections, I have discussed in some detail patterns of
Americanization in legal scholarship and case law. I wish now to complete this
cursory panorama of the main sources of law by focusing on legislation.
Instances of the influence of U.S. law on legislation in Europe are not difficult
to detect.' 6' Strict standards of liability for manufacturers are a standard
159. See generally NADER, supra note 154.
160. This section is based on Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2002), at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss I/art 1.
161. The variety of channels by which the very same pressure groups that affect WTO legislation are also
effective at the European level in drafting self-serving law is exposed by GEORGE, supra note 14. See also
Alessandro Somma, Tutte le strade portano al Fiume. L involuzione liberista del diritto comunitario, in
RIVISA CRITICA DEL DiRiTro PRIVATO 263 (2002).
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example in the comparative law literature.' 62 I wish here to focus on the very
core of European legislation: the Code.
There is no European Civil Code in place, of course, but there is a
widespread debate on whether there should be such a Code, and what it should
look like. European civilians, world masters of codification since Napoleon,
and world exporters of Civil Codes through the ages, have been receiving and
accepting advice from the hegemonic U.S. system, even in the most culturally-
loaded aspect of their theory of the sources of law.
The traditional idea of codification, which is the product of Nineteenth-
Century modernist grand style, and supported by a transcendent idea of
sovereignty vested in the State, is a comprehensive, territorial, systematic body
of private law rules claming quasi-constitutional status in the edification of the
bourgeois legal order. 163 Codes are to be applied and enforced by subordinate
institutions of the legal order. 164 The main function and posture of civil codes
in the civilian imagination is that of the gravitational center around which the
legal system rotates. In this conception, a civil code is no ordinary piece of
legislation, even though its formal status among the sources of law is the same
as any other legislative enactment. Civil Codes in Europe have been deeply
political and symbolic enactments. For example, the French Code Napoleon of
1804 contained the translation of the constitutional values of the bourgeois
revolution into professional law. 165 The German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch of
1900 was the symbolic manifesto of the rebirth of the German Empire,
incorporating much of the conservative Kantian philosophy. 166 The Italian
Civil Code of 1942 reflected the political attempt of fascism to break with the
individualistic values of the bourgeoisie in favor of a state inspired,
authoritarian social model of economy known as "corporativism." The
Mexican Civil Code of 1950 and the Eastern German Civil Code of 1975 both
attempted to reflect the political values of the socialist revolution into private
law.
162. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 32, at 251-53. Much of newly enacted European economic
legislation, from corporate governance to antitrust, shows the impressive impact of Americanization. These
fundamental developments in the economic setting of business activity confirm the theory that economic
actors are at play to create a familiar business environment, profiting at the same time from the fundamental
weakness of legal effectiveness at the periphery.
163. See generally JEAN-LOuIS HALPERIN, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE FRANCAIS DEPUIS 1804 (1996).
164. See generally Antonio Gambaro, Codice Civile, in DIGESTO IV DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE, CrVILE
(1988).
165. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 32, at 731-32 (1998).
166. Id. at 236-38.
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Present day codification proposals are much more cautious, less ambitious
and generally discussed as politically neutral. 167 They are limited in scope, as
today we are reduced to discussing whether contract law should be codified. 1
68
They are presented, borrowing from U.S. style, as "model codes" or
"restatements." Notions such as "soft law," "creeping codification," "open
texture," and "bottom-up," entirely foreign to the European legal vocabulary,
are used. 169 Such proposals are to be "interpreted," "discussed," "considered,"
and "harmonized" by a variety of other sources of law.17
0
Scholarly reaction was lukewarm when, in 1989, the Strasbourg
Parliament, the only democratically representative institution of the European
Union, for the first time recommended action in the domain of civil
codification. 171 This attitude is shared today by a number of scholars who have
expressed severe criticism to the recent, quite detailed discussion of the subject
matter, offered by the Direction General 24 of the European Commission.
72
True, some Codification proposals have been advanced by self-appointed
groups of scholars, and some of this activity (such as that of the so-called
Lando Commission) has been indeed successful in seizing the stage of
European private law. Nevertheless, perhaps because of a more rooted
positivistic imprint in European legal scholarship, the issue of legitimacy
quickly arose and even such self-appointed groups, lacking any political
legitimization whatsoever, have made it clear that their product had little in
common with the traditional idea of codification. 173  The debate over the
167. See V. Zeno-Zencovich, The European Civil Code, European Legal Traditions and Neo Positivism, in
IL CODICE CIVILE EUROPEO; MATERIALI DEI SEMINAR' 375 (G. Alpa & N. Bucicco eds., 2001).
168. See generally W. Van Gerven, L' harmonization du droit des contrats en Europe: Rapport introductif
in L' HARMONIZATION DU DROIT DES CONTRATS EN EUROPE (C. Jamin, D. Mazeaud eds., 2001).
169. See Christoph U. Schmid, Beyond the Common Market--Codification of European Contract Law,
Paper Presented at Institute of International Economic Law Conference "Function and Future of European
Law," Helsinki, (1999).
170. See, e.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA (1999);
Anothony P. Chamboredon, The Debate on a European Civil Code: For an "Open Texture", in THE
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 63-69 (Mark van Hoeke & Frangois Ost eds., 2000)
[hereinafter THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW].
171. See for example H. Koetz, Comparative Legal Research and its Function in the Development of
Harmonized Law: The European Perspective, in DE LEGE, TOWARDS UNIVERSAL LAW (Nils Jareborg ed.,
1995).
172. See Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidiarity in European Contract Law, Paper Presented at
the Society of European Contract Law Conference "Communication from the Commission on European
Contract Law," Leuven (Nov 30, 2001), at http://www.secola.org; see also Hugh Collins, Formalism and
Efficiency: Designing European Commercial Contract Law, 8 EUR. REV. PRIVACY L. 211 (2000).
173. U.S. influence evidently stays behind proposals of "restatement" of European law, notions of "model"
European codes, theories of competition between national legal systems as an efficient pattern of private law
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function of and need for a Civil Code for Europe is carried on almost entirely
within a U.S.-inspired "technological" framework of discussion about the law.
Postmodernism is the logic of late capitalism. 174  Postmodernist legal
discourse gives up claims of universality, objectivity, and monism. I17 The
nation-state blurs, sovereignty is decentralized, and legal propositions cannot be
legitimized in terms of right or wrong. Justice becomes relative, and efficiency
becomes expediency, pragmatism, and strategy.
176
"Avant garde" jurists have claimed that the law is the domain of
professionalism, culture, and technique. 177 Jurists have finally rid themselves
of positivism, state-centrism, and dogmatism in legal reasoning. Legal style has
become a pastiche of different modes of thought-many times borrowed from
experiences of different domains of knowledge or of different legal
experiences.178 Political legitimacy is the last of concerns. If legal reasoning is
a technique of argumentation, a battle of hired weapons, there is no space for
the myth of political representation. Such mode of thought, interestingly
borrowed from French leading philosophers such as Sartre, Derrida, and
Lyotard, 7 9 has characterized American legal thought from the last decade of the
Twentieth Century. 80 Its reception in the European debate on codification, in
addition to demonstrating the unprecedented influence of contemporary U.S.
law, shows in action how the building of a second nature, due to the U.S.
integration, and notions of facilitating optional "default law" as an efficient alternative to mandatory binding
legal rules. See, e.g., THE COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW PART 1: NON-PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995). For
another viewpoint, see Giuseppe Gandolfi, Pour un code europien des contrats, 91 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT CIVIL 707 (1992). The first significant results of the Pavia Group are contained in CODE
EUROPEEN DES CONTRATS-AVANT PROJECT (Giuseppe Gandolfi ed., 2001). For a recent articulated
proposal that is gaining currency in the European debate, see C. Von Bar & 0. Lando, Communication on
European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study
Group on a European Civil Code, 10 EUR. REV. PRIVACY L. 183 (2002).
174. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991);
HARVEY, supra note 97; see also JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (1984) (where he defines postmodemism as an "incredulity towards metanarratives").
175. See generally Mattei & di Robilant, supra note 123.
176. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 116; see also RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
THEORY (2001).
177. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anna Bankowska & Ruth Adler
trans., 1993).
178. See generally MINDA, supra note 116.
179. Lyotard is responsible for introducing the term "'post-modem" into critical philosophy. See LYOTARD,
supra note 174.
180. See FELDMAN, supra note 116.
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"technological" conception of law, works outside the very specific U.S.
institutional setting.'8 1
On the continent, post-modernist legal discourse has intruded on the
dominant position of legal scholarship among the sources of law.' 82 The law
has long been the domain of jurists in Europe, an elite of sophisticated
intellectuals traditionally legitimized by knowledge and scholarship.1
83
Seen from the perspective of hegemony, it is difficult not to observe that,
together with the last wave of U.S. legal influence, the European debate over
codification shows a real change in the relationship between the law and the
market. Both the soft "cultural" attitude, typical of postmodernist scepticism,
irony, and loss of faith, 84 and the technocratic approach proper of mainstream
U.S. legal thinking are functional to a new legal and economic order in which
the market governs the law rather than the other way around.185 It is no surprise
that, within this paradigm shift,186 the model code that has been able to seize the
stage of the spectacle has been the Uniform Commercial Code. This U.S.
example, which shares very little with the Civilian idea of codification (and
which in turn shows some German influence), was consciously pursued by its
"inventor" Karl Llewellyn as a professional project of merchants, with very
little in common with the core "political" project of a civilian civil code.
In order to be successful, legal institutions competing with strong economic
actors need to be strong and highly effective. The stronger the actors, the
stronger the institutions must be if individual selfishness and interest are to be
channelled for the general welfare.187 The rhetoric about the efficiency of soft
law has to be exposed in order to anticipate the impact of the Europeanization
of private law.' 88 I submit that emphasis on softness in the making of European
private law is likely to mean lawlessness and a free battleground for exploitive
business interests.
181. Martin Heidegger warned about the "technological" influence on systemic patterns of thought and the
resulting technocratic culture. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 8. It remains a recurring and important theme in
continental European philosophy.
182. See Mattei & di Robilant, supra note 123, at 1054.
183. See Antonio V. Gambaro, Western Legal Tradition, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 1, at 686.
184. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
185. See ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM AND THE EMPIRE OF
RIGHT (1995); see also SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
(1996).
186. See Mattei, supra note 160.
187. See CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 1-15 (1977).
188. Such predictive function is crucial to the comparative legal and economic analysis. See generally
Mattei & Monti, supra note 113.
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Mathias Reimann has suggested that the U.S. model should be thoroughly
appraised. 189 To be sure, because soft law is an American metaphor, we need to
place it in context. Scholars have trained us to understand that transplants of
legal institutions are not like exports of commodities.' 9" Both the contexts of
reception and origin are highly relevant in predicting what is likely to happen.
The present day European context could not be more different than the context
of U.S. law, where restatements and model codes have been suggested and
developed as soft law alternatives to hard law since the 1930s.19' The United
States of the Twentieth Century was indeed the institutional system with the
strongest judiciary in the history of humankind. The decisions of the U.S.
judiciary, reinforced by stare decisis, have never been perceived as soft.' 92 The
American judiciary's role in the process of making the general rules of the
game has always proved stronger than the role of legislators. Statutory law, in
fact, could never do much more than suggest piecemeal changes.' 93 Soft law in
the U.S. never undermined, either rhetorically or in substance, the main actors
of the legal system, who are the legitimated forces of control of the public
sphere on the economic behavior of market actors. 94 In Europe, such a
background scenario of strong self-legitimized institutional actors with inherent
powers to channel individual economic self interest in directions compatible
with the public welfare is simply absent. 195
A soft Europeanization of private law lowers responsibility for national
legal systems, persuaded as they are of the existence of another level of the
legal system that is "better located" to monitor global transactions.196 The soft
discourse at the European level undermines the prestige of national civil codes,
which are considered obsolete and out of fashion precisely because they are
189. Reimann, supra note 105.
190. See, e.g., GRANDE, supra note 8; see also Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law,
4.4 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2000), at http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html.
191. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 72 (1977).
192. See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 109.
193. Compare J.N. Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 4 W. COAST REP. 585 (1884)
with GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7 (1982) (a more recent account).
194. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SI.CLE (1997) (discussing
the use of such power by U.S. courts).
195. See generally HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1996).
196. See generally LUISA ANTONIOLLI DEFLORIAN, LA STRUTTURA ISTITUZIONALE DEL NUOVO DIRITrIO
COMUNE EUROPEO: COMPETIZIONE E CIRCOLAZIONE DEI MODELLI GIURIDICI (1996); See also generally
Roger Van den Bergh, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Community Law: Some Insights from Law
and Economics, I MAASTRJCHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 337 (1994).
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hard. 97 However, such national civil codes are the only source of principled
legitimacy of judicial power in present day Europe. Thus their cultural
undermining is a blank check to corporate rapacity.
It is not difficult, in conclusion, to see that the Americanization of the
codification process weakens European institutional effectiveness. It shifts the
balance of power even further in favor of the United States, which is
incrementally becoming the only effective legal system in the global
marketplace. More and more plaintiffs will try to litigate in the United States as
defendants continue to try to keep the cases in Europe. While American courts
will experience the luxury of deciding which cases to entertain, and American
law the luxury of providing the standards of responsibility worldwide, corporate
market actors, the real beneficiaries of the neo-American model of capitalism,
will have in Europe a giant market to exploit with very limited local restraints.
The only limits might be imposed at the center, if the American judiciary is
willing to do so.
IX. CAPITALISM V. CAPITALISM: EFFICIENCY IN LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
REVISITED
In the course of twenty years, the fundamental characteristics of U.S. law,
by a process of naturalization and of technological transformation of the legal
discourse, have ceased to be seen as one possible path in the law and, having
turned into imperial law, have been able to assert themselves as the only
alternative in global society.19 In the making of such imperial law, alternative
models foreign to the U.S. cultural imprinting have been abandoned or unable
to develop fully because of the irresistible force of U.S. legal expansionism,
which is grounded in a "market prone" reactive philosophy. Such alternative
models might be seen as patterns of resistance, in the sense that they reflect
deep traditional characteristics of what is now a new periphery, hastily
abandoned to follow models produced at the center. Such counter-forces' 99
have different characteristics and different degrees of intensity. The aggregate
of such counter-trends roughly outlines a possible alternative model that shows
197. See generally Geoffrey Samuel, English Private Law in the Context of the Codes, in THE
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 170, at 47; Chamboredon, supra note 170, at 64.
198. GRANDE, supra note 8 (showing that this process happens in the domain of criminal procedure).
199. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
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some interesting features for the development of an antagonistic alternative to
the present path of legal globalization. °°
The previous cursory analysis of the recessive trends in the process of
Americanization of European law offers the traits of a European social way,
grounded in the central position of the welfare State, in which the public
domain and the domain of politics seem much broader than the private domain
and the domain of the market. As a model of economy and development, the
European "social way" was discussed during its political dismantling by French
economist Michel Albert, in his classic discussion of what he calls the "Rhine
capitalist model" developed in Germany, Scandinavian countries, Holland,
Switzerland, and Japan in the aftermath of World War II.201 This model, that
we will simply name "social capitalism" (as opposed to neo-American or
imperial capitalism), deserves a closer look, because it sheds light on the
possibilities and limits of counter-fires in the process of the making of imperial
law.
The social model of capitalism, according to Albert's analysis, shows
notable efficiency as compared to the Neo-American alternative, based on the
surrender of the state structures to private capital and short-term financial
interests. Albert finds the following benefits of the social model over the
American model: the stabilizing intervention of the State; the strong role of
trade unions in the creation of a secure and stable marketplace in which workers
develop patterns of loyalty to their employer; a public sector of welfare
assistance capable of limiting the costs of social exclusion; a strong system of
public education and scientific research that does not penalize areas of
knowledge that are incapable of attracting private investment;2°2 and a
conception of the corporation as a durable relational institution that the State
will protect, in consideration of the protection that such an institution offers to
its members. Albert argues that these factors make the social model preferable
203in terms of economic efficiency as well as social justice.
200. A collection of papers devoted to globalization seen from the perspective of the losers in the process
can be found in the Symposium Globalization at the Margins. Perspectives on Globalization from
Developing States, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999). See also VIEWS FROM THE SOUTH: THE
EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO ON THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES (Sarah Anderson ed., 2000).
201. See ALBERT, supra note 10, at 127-90.
202. Cf DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE
CAPITALISM (1977).
203. The outcome of such an aggregate of factors is a major increase of family savings in the countries
following the social alternative between 1980 and 1990 as opposed to a decrease of the same figures in the
United States. See ALBERT, supra note 10, at 191-210. For updated information, see TABB, supra note 2.
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Albert presents the social alternative and Neo-American model as two
structures of capitalism competing fiercely with each other. Albert adopts an
old metaphor of Schumpeter, according to whom "It is thanks to the brakes that
cars can go faster." Applying this image to his analysis of the two capitalisms,
Albert concludes 20 4 that it is thanks to the brakes imposed by the public powers
and the civil society that the best economic development can be obtained. The
impressive amount that the French economist offers allows him to conclude that
"it is not true that economic efficiency requires social injustices.... Between
justice and efficiency exists a strong integration today more than ever; we found
it in all countries following the Renanian model., 205
Historically, capitalism has evolved and diffused itself mostly by means of
one of the most traditionally studied market failures: externalities. There is a
pattern of development based on leaving the social costs where they fall.206
Presently, such social costs are produced mostly by environmental catastrophes
and labor exploitation of women and children. Reactive institutions-local,
foreign, or transnational-are simply incapable of handling the tremendous
pressure that any attempt to internalize such externalities produces for
institutional actors. Two recent papers, devoted to the Bophal catastrophe 20 7
and to the market for toys, 208 dramatically demonstrate the incredibly complex
aggregate of interests and "technical problems" that make it impossible for
reactive institutions to attempt internalization.
Imperial law is an institutional setting that does not compel market actors to
internalize their social CoStS. 20 9 No efficient economic system lives outside of
an institutional setting.210 Promoting reactive institutions as the only alternative
takes away the very features of the legal system that might internalize
externalities, and as a consequence, ground an efficient economic model.
204. ALBERT, supra note 10, at 127-28.
205. Id. at 128 (translation from Italian mine); Within a school of thought more familiar to the American
readership, G. Calabresi argues, developing on the notion of merit goods, the necessary integration between
distribution and efficiency in public policymaking. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC
CHOICES (1978). Mainstream law and economics, to the contrary, follows the traditional economist's rhetoric
of a full separation between the domain of distribution and the domain of efficiency. See RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
206. For a critical discussion, see generally J.M. BLAUT, THE COLONIZER'S MODEL OF THE WORLD:
GEOGRAPHIC DIFFUSION AND EUROCENTRIC HISTORY (1993).
207. See M. Galanter, Law's Elusive Problem: Learning from Bophal, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESSES, supra note 1, at 172.
208. Snyder, supra note 2.
209. See supra Part lI.B.
210. See generally DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
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In the absence of high transaction costs limiting their diffusion, efficient
legal solutions would be dominant in the global marketplace of legal ideas.21'
If such an analysis could be extended more generally to political and economic
institutions, one should see a major diffusion of the more fair and efficient
social capitalism and a concomitant incremental recession of the neo-American
model, yet this is far from being the case. According to Albert:
In the very moment in which the neo-American model proves
to be less efficient than the social model, it nevertheless
succeeds in gaining a competitive advantage from the political
and ideological perspective .... Because of the fact of the
social and economic superiority of the social model we could
expect to see it triumph also on the political ground.... [T]he
very contrary is happening. The social model is literarily
overwhelmed by the political and cultural influences of its
American competitor and as a matter of fact it is progressively
212left behind from the political perspective.
The dismantling of the social model means abandoning the proactive role
of the government in the economy in favor of a reactive one. The decline of a
proactive role of the government in the economy necessarily transfers
decisionmaking authority to its reactive institutions, i.e. courts of law. In
continental Europe, perhaps for the first time, the logic of public law is yielding
to that of private law, so that a process of hybridization of the two traditionally
separate areas of legal knowledge is taking place.21 3
As proactive institutions are dismantled, there is the need for stronger
214
reactive ones, or total lawlessness follows. Nevertheless, Albert's analysis
211. See Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994). The ideas developed in that paper have gained some currency in the debate on
European codification of private law, where, particularly in the last few years, one can see an attempt to
"select" the rules to be included in the code on the basis of technical reasons such as efficiency. See the
discussion supra Part VIII.
212. See ALBERT, supra note 10, at 244 (translation from Italian is author's).
213. The large number of new "authorities," from privacy to telecommunications, both at the European level
and at the level of member states, are applying the logic of private law and function in a remarkably similar
way to that of their American counterparts. For the first time in their history, European private lawyers (and
ordinary courts) have ceased to believe that there is another direct circuit of decisionmaking dealing with the
public domain so that some public policy concerns emerge in the private law reasoning. See generally
HESSELINK, supra note 107.
214. Weak reactive institutions are a problem only because of the dismantling of the strong proactive
institutions. A rush to upgrade courts of law and to modify the pattern of legal reasoning in private law,
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shows that, from the efficiency perspective, the dismantling of the proactive
institutions of the social model of capitalism should be questioned. Such
questioning does not occur because of the process of cultural influence and
hegemonic rule that the American model has been able to create. Once the
consequence of the problem (the increasing role of reactive institutions) is
identified as the problem itself (reactive institutions in the periphery are weak)
there is no question that American law is able to offer an apparently efficient
institutional setting to imitate.
X THE "SPECTACLE" AND "COUNTER-FIRES"
Albert is no radical. He considers the global spread of less efficient neo-
American capitalism as a paradox. He tries to explain this spread using notions
of seductiveness and appeal, drawing on the intrinsic characteristics of the neo-
American model as a success story of the risk-taking, gambling and glittery life-
style. 15
216In the radical analysis of French revolutionary thinker Gui Debord t, one
finds a thoroughly developed theory capable of explaining the present path of
the law. Within Debord's analysis, it seems possible to solve the fundamental
puzzle approached in this essay: the relationship between the American and the
imperial model.
In 1967, Debord described, in quite difficult language, two models of
spectacular society: the diffused model of the capitalist economy, and the
therefore, is a necessity only when the logic of the dismantling is already accepted. Interestingly, the
weakness of courts in the Third World (meaning the difference of adjudicatory models from that of the United
States) is considered by the World Bank to be the main problem in the law, to be targeted through structural
adjustments programs. This obsession with the progression from legality to development to courts of law (or
ADR devices) can be perceived in all its pervasiveness by looking at the papers included in the annotated
bibliography offered by the website of the World Bank devoted to legal development. For a critique of ADR
as yet another institution based on the dominance of imperial law, see Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande,
Current Illusions and Delusions in Conflict Management: In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
573 (2002).
215. Cf ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SoctErY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP
GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1996).
216. This remarkable intellectual, fierce enemy of Sartre and Lyotard (excluded, for this reason, from the
inner circles of French militant intellectuals), used to say that he considered it vulgar to be an authority in
social critique rather than being an authority in the system criticized. His book, The Society of the Spectacle,
was first published in 1967, and though almost never cited was remarkably influential. It was updated in 1988
with an essay that develops a full-fledged theory of what he calls the "integrated spectacle" as the model of
social and economic domination of the post cold-war. See DEBORD, supra note 40.
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centralized model of the communist alternative.217 The end of the Cold War,
Debord argued as early as 1988, has produced a hybridization of the two
models, with the spectacular notion of freedom, typical of the capitalist
alternative, merged with the repressive and authoritarian conception of order
proper of the Stalinist spectacle. This "integrated spectacle" makes the
apparent opposites live in the same spectacular body. Highly dramatic
economic adventures in which the spirit of freedom gets exalted coexist with
highly dramatic and spectacular exercises of repression in which the forces of
the all mighty Empire become the object of cult.218
Debord is not alone in emphasizing the role of media and of the spectacular
dimension in the present phase of world history. For example, Jean
Beaudrillard, in his book The Perfect Crime, and Pierre Bourdieu, in a variety
of recent interventions, both stress the impact of television and spectacular
models on notions of representation and democracy. 219 Using the notion of
spectacle is thus very tempting in exploring globalization and hegemony in
legal consciousness, particularly in attempting to shed light on the phenomenon
that puzzled Albert, expansion of a less efficient alternative.
One may argue that the only way to create an efficient setting for the global
market is to develop a thorough and efficient global system of control of
externalities, something that requires mighty, proactive institutions in order to
be at all efficient. Nevertheless, the alliance between strong international
market actors and the reactive legal philosophy functional to their needs is what
gives the U.S. legal consciousness the comparative advantage that produces its
success. Short-term benefits typical of financial market capitalism do not
require externality controls, because it is exactly the possibility of capitalizing
here and now, with long term externalities imposed on the periphery, that
explains its spectacular appeal.220
World renowned Italian economist Carlo M. Cipolla explains the tension
between short-term and long-term efficiency thus: "The history of our happy
generations can be shortly described as follows: for millions and millions of
years a treasure has been accumulated. Then somebody in the family has
discovered the treasure and started to dissipate it. Humankind today is living in
a period of tremendous dissipation. In a single year we consume more coal
217. DEBORD, supra note 40, at 193.
218. Id. at 193; see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988).
219. See supra text accompanying note 20.
220. It is too easy to show in the recent Enron and WorldCom disasters the impact of the strategy of
privatizing controls.
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than how much it is produced in one hundred centuries of natural formation of
solid consumable energy sources. ,
221
The institutional setting of the imperial marketplace, short of being more
efficient, seems only to be better adaptable to the needs of short-term
exploitation of the treasure accumulated in millions of years. Of course, energy
consumption is not at all equally spread in the world, and the United States is
on the top of the list of energy consumption. Consuming energy is a highly
spectacular activity. It is a form of common sense to credit to the spectacle of
consumption the fall of the Soviet Empire.
Law is a cultural aspect of any society. A spectacular society is likely to
produce spectacular law.222 If it is true, as Freud once apparently said, that
exaggeration is a key to success and leadership,223 there is little question that
U.S. law has been capable of exaggerating the fundamental aspects of western
law, making them highly spectacular: judges challenge the political power and
re-write the history of their country; rights are enforced without frontiers;
lawyers are portrayed as living success stories; scholars are engaged in highly
creative intellectual exercises with little restraint from the actual technicalities
of the law;224 electoral processes are organized as time-circumscribed displays
of personality cults; there is spectacular assertion of the institutional power of
life and death; and the law is glamorized in movies, best sellers, and television
shows featuring glittering and highly photogenic police cars. All of these are
22 1. CARLO M. CIPOLLA, UOMINI, TECNICHE, ECONOMIE 61 (1983).
222. See Anna di Robilant, The Aesthetics of Law, I GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 1 (2001), at http://
www.bepress.com/gj/advances/voll/iss2/artl; Pierre Schlag, TheAesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1047 (2002).
223. Interview with David Daube, Professor Emeritus of Law, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, in Berkeley, Cal.
(1990).
224. Even the model of a German professorial career-long, boring, and demanding because of the duty to
write the habilitation-shift-is short-circuited. Young German academics are offered chairs in the United
States, are Americanized in their ways of thinking, and might be directly called to German Universities
without habilitation if one day they wish to do so. It is easy to demur on the point that the European model of
procedure, with the extensive role of clerks in service of process and in discovery, and an emphasis on written
rather than oral confrontation, is less exciting than the American fishing expeditions, tournaments of resume
in scientific evidence, and cross examination of witnesses in the hands of a flamboyant bar. Imagine how
boring would be a movie about a German attorney, most of the time sitting in his office, writing a brief with
his copy of the Konmmentar at hand! Some data are offered by Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of
American Law in Europe, 39 AM J. COMP. L. 229 (1991); see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) (an influential sociological study on a new-born class of transnational
lawyers).
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aspects of the law "going pop, '225 abandoning the dusty Kafkian bureaucratic
scenarios to be promoted as part of the imaginative domain of the integrated
spectacle.
Thus, what becomes global is not so much the effective, binding, and nitty-
gritty American law, but rather its spectacular aspects. It is not efficiency but
the spectacle of efficiency; it is not the actual organization of justice but the
spectacle ofjustice.22 6 Impoverished public institutions of the welfare state, in
health care as well as in education, are compared to private ones using
standards that always make public works look worse.227 The proactive
institutions of governance, staffed with underpaid personnel, are depicted as
"bureaucracies" and become less and less attractive to bright global young
people.
To be sure, the analysis cannot remain on the merely technical level of
lawyer's discourses. The law is an intimate part of the "integrated spectacle"
and performs a central part in the public political discourse. De Tocqueville
noticed its centrality in America two hundred years ago. 228  Today, this
discursive practice of legality is reproduced at the global level and is one of the
salient features of imperial law. There is no issue of global governance-from
the legality of the war, to legal aspects of global intellectual property rights, to
the consequences of non-aligned politics by spectacularly portrayed "rough
states"-that is not appraised in legal terms. Such legal terms are of course
spectacular, vulgarized, simplified, and exaggerated for the needs of media
consumption.
To be entertaining, the integrated spectacle of course requires antagonists,
too. The end of communism makes new polarizations emerge. "Capitalism
versus socialism" gets transformed in "democracy and the rule of law" versus
"the axis of evil." Comparisons become ideological. Portraits are offered with
strong traits. The legal aspects of the first model are promoted and emphasized
as fair, efficient, natural, and good. The legal aspects of the second are unfair,
225. See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000).
226. The legal aspects of the "other capitalism" are dull, which is emphasized in U.S. academia and in the
"more advanced" circles of the European legal profession. The traditional German, Italian, or French literary
style is perceived as mere "black letter;" it is not creative enough. Conversely, creativity is emphasized in the
U.S. academy. See James Gordley, Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the United
States, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 369 (1993).
227. It is already accepted as a fact, for example, that in the law school rankings of U.S. News and World
Report, the highest rankings are beyond the reach of public institutions.
228. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 27 (main thesis of the book).
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medieval, inefficient, obscurantist, unnatural, and bad. The antagonist changes;
the strategy stands still.
Institutional alternatives are politically appraised according to their degree
of adherence with the spectacular ideal. What follows is that the U.S. legal
system is naturally the leader.2 29  The Latin alternative-with its different
pattern of sexual relationships, emphasis on extended family ties, traits of state-
centrism and remains of socialism, Mediterranean political sensitivity that is
more open and understanding to the fundamental traits of the Arabic world, and
less efficient organization of its everyday life-gets portrayed (and sometimes
is self-portrayed) as obsolete, untrustworthy, and governed by a fundamentally
macho philosophy.
What in this essay I call "Latin resistance," short from being an organized
counter-hegemonic force, is a random aggregate of political and philosophic
thinking, of political action and of protest, rooted in a radically critical and
revolutionary political project. Latin resistance is the radical questioning of a
model of development that people increasingly see as arrogant, racist, and
ultimately self-destructive for humankind.230 Confronted with the Latin
resistance, imperial law displays an unprecedented degree of spectacular
repression. 231 The sensitivity of this alternative project is rooted in the dramatic
history of de-colonization and, in particular, in the War of Algeria.2 32 In this
cultural humus, the question of Islam, and of developing a model of coexistence
rather than a clash of civilizations, is inherently solved within the Latin
resistance in the refusal of a North-South polarization as a successor of the
West-East standoff. The strategy is to develop respect for demographic trends
rather than attempting to build useless technological walls.2 33 The strategy is to
229. For a fascinating series of generalizations, see JEAN-PHILIPPE MATHY, FRENCH RESISTANCE: THE
FRENCH-AMERICAN CULTURE WARS (2000). For a more specific discussion in the institutional domain, see
Judith Beth Prowda, United States Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture " and the French "Cultural
Exception ", 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 200 (1997).
230. For an introduction to such a counter-hegemonic movement, see generally TABB, supra note 2. See
also DEMOCRATIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE BATTLE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 2001) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIZING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY].
231. An incredibly brutal repression, most of the time supported by the media, has characterized
demonstrations from Seattle to Genoa. See. e.g., T.L. Friedman, Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1999, at 23; see also, AA. VV., GENOVA IL LIBRO BIANCO (2002) (pictures and texts on the brutality at
Genoa).
232. An event crucial in the development of the political thought of Foucault, Althusser, Derrida and many
others, including Sartre. See, e.g., FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 7 (Constance Farrington
trans., 1963).
233. Some of these themes can be found in the work of Nobel laureate Amartya K. Sen.
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expose the variety of western colonial strategies used to deny the historical role
of the East and South in human civilization,234 and in particular to develop a
thorough critique of ethnocentrism, both conscious and unconscious. Such
ethnocentrism is itself highly inefficient because it reinforces a model of legal
development (the present legal agenda of the World Bank, IRF, and WTO) that
is rooted in the production of externalities that only highly proactive and
politically legitimized strategies of global governance could tackle.23 5
Examples abound of the naturalization of the ethnocentricity that simply
precludes legal scholars from seeing macroscopic violations of genuine notions
of equality and the rule of law. Take, for example, the production of a toy.
Directives on products liability, developed in Europe under the clear influence
236of U.S. lawyers, contain one such hidden and technically motivated example
of discriminating ethnocentrism. A child that gets damaged by a toy within
Europe can seek and find redress in the law. Thousands of children who,
during the process of production of the very same toy, are poisoned and have
their health ruined, can seek no redress. Arbitrarily, the moment in which a
product is considered for the purpose of liability is the moment in which it is
introduced in the Western market, reaching the stage of the spectacle.
Many colleagues would argue that these are problems that go beyond the
domain of private law.237 Indeed, this is exactly my point. There is a need for a
shift in mode of thought, to escape traditional taxonomies and ideas. The Latin
resistance offers a reservoir of radically critical thinking that needs to be
applied to the legal discourse.
Most of the externalities, most of the social costs dumped in the backyard
of our weaker neighbors of the South, are created during the process of
producing commodities that are consumed mainly by the roughly 300 million
people that make up the European market.238 Such production is traditionally
ignored by private law, concerned as it is only with final outcomes. In
economic terms, this simply introduces an alternative. Either European
consumers pay too little for their commodities because their prices do not
234. See Monateri, supra note 128 (discussing the history of Western legal tradition).
235. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (criticizing IMF policies); see
also David Moberg, Silencing Joseph Sliglitz, in DEMOCRATIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 230, at
127 (noting that the World Bank's response to Stiglitz' criticism was to let him go as special adviser).
236. This influence is a classic example in comparative law. See generally SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note
32.
237. A distinguished German colleague made this point at the Max Plank Institute in Hamburg when I
delivered part of this paper in May 2002.
238. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO (2000) (discussing such processes of externalization).
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reflect the true social costs of production (environmental damage, labor
exploitation, and so forth) and European capitalism is once again subsidized by
former colonies,239 or multinational corporate logo-lords (mostly European,
Japanese, and North American) make unfair profits pocketing the value of such
social costs. 24° In both cases, such an economic reality should be a concern for
the European policymaker drafting the rules of the game. Unfortunately it is
not, since the rules of the game-in Europe and even more visibly in more
remote areas of the periphery-are de facto drafted by the international
financial institutions.
Imperial law, and the post-modem, market-friendly ideology that it carries
with it, might already be precluding the construction of a European social
market as a counter-fire. The tremendous capacity of imperial law to introduce
discursive practices that depict legal production as pro-consumer, when it is in
fact stimulated by the large international capital, is now beginning to be
exposed. 241 Europe is facing a number of constitutional moments. 242 It is
difficult to evaluate them because the spectacle makes options difficult to
distinguish. One can, however, see that some scholarly positions are facilitating
the final triumph of imperial law. Following the trend in the Americanized
legal landscape, without approaching the real issues of externality control, only
confirms Europe as a periphery of the economic Empire. Whether resistance
can be organized, and at what level, is more difficult to tell.243
XI. THE NEXT STAGE: FROM AMERICAN HEGEMONY TO "EMPIRE" IN THE
LAW
Major structural changes are occurring in the assertion of U.S. hegemony.
To begin with, the issue of territoriality has made itself dramatically felt, 244 so
239. See ANIA LOOMBA, KOLONYALIZM, POSTKOLONYALIZM [COLONIALISM/POSTCOLONIALISM] (2000).
240. This is the fundamental thesis of KLEIN, supra note 238, and of many other critiques of corporate
globalization.
241. See GEORGE, supra note 14; see also Allesandro Somma, ll diritto dei consumatori 9 un diritto
dell'impresa, POLITICA DEL DIRITTO 679-88 (1998).
242. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 165-71 (1991) (exemplifying the notion of constitutional
moment); see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2407-08 (1991) (in
the European institutional context).
243. For a skeptical view of legal scholarship's ability to contribute in the liberating struggle, see MINDA,
supra note 116, at 247-57.
244. See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY (1979) (asserting that
capitalism (the fundamental source of imperial law) has always been the province of the world economy rather
than of the nation state).
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that the very idea that the present phase in global legal consciousness is that of
a global Americanization has to be approached carefully. In this essay I have
suggested that American legal consciousness has permeated what is now a
dominant layer of the world legal systems: imperial law.
World interdependence has increased in the second half of the Twentieth
Century, the era corresponding with Americanization in the law. Boundaries of
knowledge, as well as of territory, have largely collapsed.2 45 In the law, a
variety of modes of thought have always competed in history, so that even when
one speaks of French or German leadership characterizing the era preceding
World War II, some distinctions must be accounted for.246 When it comes to
the second half of the Twentieth Century, that of U.S. leadership,
contaminations appear even more clearly, so that one could argue that U.S. law
is in fact the outcome of the merger of the civil law and common law traditions,
where traits of originality can be kept visible only by means of some artificial
effort.247
There are at least two factors to be considered. Issues of resistance, both
technical and political, are enriching the picture. From the technical point of
view, legal cultures in the world can provide resistance, in the sense that many
local legal professionals simply do not have direct access to the American legal
248discourse. Many lawyers, even in the former center of the legal world, do not
read English language materials, so their perception of U.S. legal consciousness
is, at best, filtered.
Many non-American lawyers, imbedded in state-centric positivism, and
drawing on local notions of separation of power and political accountability
(and legitimacy), simply fail to imagine that certain things can be governed by
courts of law. This kind of resistance, sometimes called "legal path
dependency," can strongly limit the way in which the imperial layer of the law
245. A general hybridization makes it extremely difficult to keep even ideal types distinct. Thus, the very
utility of using ideal types as heuristic devices can, on the one hand, be questioned while, on the other hand, it
becomes a most stringent necessity to make sense of an increasing degree of complexity. See HARVEY, supra
note 97; see also ANTI-OEDIPUS, supra note 97, at 217-22; LYOTARD, supra note 174, at 30.
246. This phenomenon is stronger if one looks from the perspective of content rather than only from the
geographic origins of one mode of thought. The French social model was at least enriched by German
contributions, while the Pandectist approach, on whose leadership in the second half of the Nineteenth
Century there seems to be agreement, was certainly "contaminated" by contributions from a variety of
countries.
247. See the discussion above on the derivative rather than original character of U.S. law. Supra text
accompanying notes 29, 30, 31.
248. Cf Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227
(2000).
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erodes local legal sensitivity. Nevertheless, steps in the direction of developing
stronger courts of law are very visible throughout Europe and, as part of
structural adjustment programs, also through the more traditional periphery of
the world.249 Captured by the Americanized legal discourse, the periphery of
the world attempts to upgrade its institutional setting in order to look as
American as possible by emulating the reactive models found in courts of law
and academic legal education. 250 Both these adjustments end up moving in the
direction of what anthropologist Laura Nader, linguist Noam Chomsky, and
other critical thinkers have significantly portrayed as an anti-international law
movement unfolding in present-day American law.25 t It is the final assault of
imperial law on all such institutions of the nation-state that do not fit its profile
favoring economic hegemony and global corporate governance.252 Institutional
discourses that claim the primacy of politics over law are abandoned in favor of
aspects that make economic power stronger than a legal order. Scholars have
detected this phenomenon in a variety of areas of U.S. law, such as the so-
called tort law reform, by which powerful corporate defendants try to
emasculate the plaintiffs' bar for fear of class actions and punitive damages.
Another example is the shift towards compulsory ADR and the tremendous
pressure to settle disputes with the goal of silencing victims of abuse in the
workplace or in the family.
253
249. See generally EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM E. RATLIFF, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
DEVELOPMENT (1997).
250. Japan, a frontrunner in adaptive reception of modernized institutions, is introducing graduate legal
education influenced by American law. See Shozo Ota & Kahei Rokumoto, Issues ofthe Lawyer Population:
Japan, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315 (1993). Such reformas are in advanced phase of implementation. See
Symposyunm on Japanese Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 545 (2001).
251. See NADER, supra note 154; cf CHOMSKY, supra note 66.
252. See generally HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 10 (describing the idea of globalization as empire); SUSAN
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996)
(discussing the competing but complementary idea of globalization as Americanization).
253. Oppression by means of"harmony ideology," is gaining currency in Europe, where false arguments in
favor of weak consumers accompany the proliferation of suggestions of alternative forums for efficient
disposal of consumer's disputes. It is apparent, however, that the mediation alternative in unbalanced power
contexts sacrifices the interests of the weak for those of the strong. Corporate international market players
highly value predictability of damage awards such as those stemming from the emasculation ofjuries and
from the outcomes of mediation because predictability makes the costs easily transferable to consumers and
easily insurable. See LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990) (explaining the notion of Harmony Ideology as a controlling process); see also
NADER, supra note 154. Interestingly, the European Commission has just produced a White Paper suggesting
extensive introduction of ADR in European consumer law. By so doing corporate actors can "cap" their
liability by transferring the costs of accidents to consumers, though only of those accidents occurring within
Europe.
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In the academic domain, a very similar philosophy, labeled as an upgrading
of obsolete positivistic modes of thought, is visible in the creation of a strong
and prestigious conservative scholarly critique of the politically legitimate
sources of law. Such critique, in order to show the efficiency of market-
friendly reactive institutions (and of the common-law process) has accused
proactive institutions such as legislatures or administrative agencies of being
captured by lobbyists' money.25 4 This idea is orthodox in those U.S. law and
economics circles that have been able to gain major influence in framing the
international financial institutions' development plans for the Third World. It
is by no means absent in Europe today.2 "
Imperial law copes with the resistance coming from legal path dependency
by producing a new generation of lawyers, cosmopolitan in their training and
exposed to the new institutional setting of imperial law, to substitute for the old
(path dependent and resisting) professionals in whatever project is important to
global capital.2 56 Dualism, discussed in the development literature devoted to
the economics of the Third World, is now a particularly useful notion in
understanding changes in the global legal profession.257 Local lawyers,
incapable of expressing themselves in English, although often more skilled and
254. See Kennedy, supra note 114 (providing a critical discussion of the politically conservative background
of law and economics).
255. Such an attitude that considers "legal science" as neutral and insulated from capture is similar to the
classic law and economics attitude that considers the "common law process" insulated. But such an idea is no
more robust (or less arbitrary) in the old continent than it is in the United States. The high degree of
insulation of U.S. courts by law that should shield them from any risk of capture is only accepted as an article
of faith by mainstream American legal culture (the prestige of Article III of the U.S. Constitution is
tremendous). There is no empirical testing whatsoever regarding the effectiveness of the insulation devices
provided by Article III of the U.S. Constitution for the members of the federal judiciary (concerning tenure of
office and guaranteed salary). Such position is taken by a variety of scholars, such as C. Kirchner, Roger Van
den Bergh, and Hugh Collins. See C. Kirchner, An Optionan European Civil Code: Initiating a Learning
Process, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 399 (Stefan Grundman & Jules
Stuyk eds., 2002) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]; Roger Van den Bergh, ForcedHarmonisation of Contract Law
in Europe: Not to Be Continued, in GREEN PAPER, supra note 255; Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and
Subsidiarity in Eurpoean Contract Law, in GREEN PAPER, supra note 255. But such normative use of a
biased version of law and economics is even more dangerous in the European legal landscape than in the
United States. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Political Stakes in "Merely Technical" Issues of
Contract Law, 10 EUR. REV. PRiv. LAW 7 (2002).
256. See R. Abel, The Promise and Peril of International Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES,
supra note l, at 213.
257. Indeed this phenomenon in the domain of the law is the perfect equivalent of the impact on local
distribution (small business and so forth) of the international chains of massive distribution increasingly
swallowing a large sphere of what used to be local business. See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Making the
Other Path Efficient: Economic Analysis and Tort Law in Less Developed Countries, 1 CARDozo EL. L.
BUL. 8, 3.4 (1995) http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Torts/Matteil.html.
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experienced than the emerging elite, are confined to an increasingly shrinking
local sector, dealing with the less important and prestigious aspects of legal
business. The increasing presence of transnational law firms through the world
is perfect evidence of such dualism, something that limits the resisting impact
of legal path dependency by incrementally reducing its sphere of relevance. By
penalizing the more senior members of the local legal professions outside of the
United States, the cultural and linguistic gap is creating a real issue of access to
law. 25
8
Imperial law penetrates worldwide, with its reactive philosophy, its rhetoric
of legality, and its practice of oppression.259 The current relationship between
the Western legal tradition and contexts of alternative legality (most notably but
not limited to Islamic law) is a fascinating example of the way in which legal
Americanization is transformed into legal Empire. The features of American
law that get incorporated into imperial law are the spectacular ones, and the
features that do not fit the spectacular picture are simply dismissed or ignored
as non-legal. American law is then ceasing to be a real legal system, with a
local history, local concerns, and local shames, concretely governing the social
relationships among the population living within its jurisdictional boundaries.
American law is instead transformed into a show and assumes an eternally
present imperial identity that puts it beyond the issue of compatibility with
possibly incompatible local contexts and circumstances. Recent scholarship, in
such different contexts as Latin America and China, has denounced the strategy
by which this imperial legal identity has been obtained. Scholarship in the
tradition of "law and development" has constantly stressed the "gap"--the lack
of "real law"-in Latin America. 260 Developing on the idea of Orientalism as
proposed by Edward Said, recent scholarly accounts of general legal history, as
well as of developments in Chinese law,26' have pointed out the process of de-
legalization of non-western legal traditions. This very same strategy of
258. This is a phenomenon perhaps similar to that of unequal access to authority due to differences in size of
libraries, once well documented in the United States by Professor Merryman, and now successfully solved, at
least in the United States, by the diffusion of Lexis and Westlaw. See generally John Henry Merryman, The
Authority ofAuthority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950,6 STAN. L. REV. 613,613 (1954).
259. Blackmail by international financial institutions is today the main method of using the advantages of
imperial law. This is scarcely a new phenomenon. Modernization projects have been based on blackmail
through the history of legal transplants, with notable examples in early twentieth century China and Japan.
Blackmail has been recently re-named the "context of conditionality." See Moore, supra note 22.
260. See Jorge Esquirol, Paper Presented at the Harvard Conference on Critical Globalization (Apr. 12,
2002).
261. See Monateri, supra note 128; see also Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MiCH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
2003)
446 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 10:383
spectacular de-legalization of alternative contexts of legality is even more
visible in contexts whose resistance to the "integrated spectacle" is stronger and
is perceived as more dangerous. The campaign for the promotion of human
rights and of woman's equality 62 in Islamic societies, based on the one-sided
and spectacular emphasis on a few aberrant practices and episodes by means of
extensive media coverage, is a plain attempt to substitute local legal and
political legitimacy with the imperial one.263 Horrific episodes of brutality in
the way in which the law is enforced and applied are unfortunately common at
264the very center of the legal Empire.
The imperial ideal, as produced by the spectacular society, cannot be
challenged by historical accounts of political failures of any kind, whether
located at the center or at the periphery. Within the logic of the integrated
spectacle, to use the reality of the U.S. legal system as a way to challenge the
imperial ideal of democracy and the rule of law makes no sense. It would be
exactly the same thing as attempting to challenge the suburban family dream of
middle America as it appears in the advertising of minivans, mortgage plans, or
life insurance policies by using the high rate of vicious divorce litigation or the
miserable conditions of dispossessed homeowners that have defaulted in paying
the mortgage installment.26 5
What is the fate of political resistance, of counter-hegemonic forces within
this scenario? To be sure, one should be careful to distinguish the theory from
the practice. The generalized belief of the spectacular world seems to be that
military technology and violence will be able to defeat demography. We are
bound to be awakened from this denial. Demography has always overwhelmed
military technology, particularly when the distribution of resources that such
262. One should consider the brilliant insight of Camille Paglia, that stiletto heels are the Western version of
Chinese foot binding in a population of women obsessed by the male constructed myth of beauty. See
CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE 145-46 (1992); see also NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY
MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (1992).
263. See Obiora, supra note 70.
264. One only has to name them, from the "suicide" of political opponents in German and Italian jails, to the
prisoners' conditions at Guantanamo, to the execution of the mentally retarded and minors in the United
States, to the "suspension" of human rights in Ireland, in the Palestinian territories, or even in Genoa right
under the windows of the leaders of the integrated spectacle, gathering together in one of the G8 meetings.
265. In the process of transformation from "American law" into "spectacular imperial law," the role of the
movie industry and of the international mass media has been enormous. Both the professional branches that
make the "reactive" model of governance the essence of imperial law have been receiving their share of
Hollywood attention. While Julia Roberts in Erin Brokovich can be seen as the most symbolic testimonial of
the opportunities that courts of law can offer to a Western woman fighting for the good cause, Legally Blond
and A BeautifulMind stage the wonderful objective fairness of the most prestigious chains of transmission of
global knowledge in the Imperial world: the U.S. academia and the Nobel Committee.
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violence sustains is in the interest of the very few and makes the vast majority
very unhappy. In history, the rules of the game that favor the few have always
been changed, either incrementally or by means of revolution.266
What I have labeled as the Latin resistance has been itself largely
incorporated into the show, geographically displaced and deeply transformed by
its acceptance and assimilation in the discursive practices of the mainstream
academy. The strategy used to reach this result has been once again that of de-
contextualization. Anybody who has learned a lesson from the need to use
context in order to make significant comparisons is able to see the existence of
an American Foucault different from the French Foucault, an American
Gramsci different from an Italian Gramsci, and an American Althusser different
from a French Althusser. The context of production is plainly ignored, so that,
out of context, what is left is only the spectacular side of any theory. The
nature of "grand theory" and of "revolutionary practice" of the work of such
thinkers has been almost entirely cancelled by a variety of post-modernist
discursive strategies able to go as far as analyzing within one framework such
radically different political messages as "neo-pragmatism" in law and
economics and many of the second generation narratives of critical legal
studies.267
Once assimilated by the context of reception (the American pluralist
academic discourse), and applied for the first time to the analysis of the
(reactive) legal institutions as they appear in the American receiving context,
the Latin resistance gets exported once again in the new and old periphery,
deeply transformed in political meaning and significantly de-radicalized. What
use, if any, the new radical elites in the periphery will be able to make of such
theories is an issue open for discussion.
Political radicalism and polarization are the foes of the show society, which
needs broad areas of relative social peace in order to further develop the
boundaries of the global unrestricted market. Attempts to change the course of
events, to protest and expose the "natural evolution," that have led to the
present state of imperial dualism are either demonized or dismissed as nafve.
266. The American Revolution is one of the most fascinating examples from this perspective. The chances
of success against the almighty British army were not high and they were not perceived as such by the main
revolutionary actors. See ELLIS, supra note 29. Hence, there is still room to dream of a revolution originating
in less developed countries. The survival of leaders such as Hugo Chavez in South America, or movements
giving birth to the African Union in order to solve the problem of internal warfare, might all be signs of hope.
See Fidel Castro, We Either Unite or We Die, in DEMOCRATIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 230, at
74.
267. See generally MINDA, supra note 116.
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Whether genuine counter-hegemonic forces will be able to modify the present
path of imperial globalization with new forms of political and economic
struggle capable of re-asserting effective legal (and political) control over
unlimited exploitive patterns is an open question that is in urgent need of an
effective answer. The exploitation of the world commons is rapidly
268approaching tragic outcomes.
268. See G. Hardin, supra note 13, at 1243.
